Enhancing Implementation ‘Know-How’ and ‘Do-How’ to Support Delivery of Results: Sierra Leone Civil Service Reform

Kay Winning and Roberto O. Panzardi
Abstract

Discussion in the donor community is now concentrating more systematically on the ‘how to’ of project implementation. New frameworks are being applied to promote and sustain organizational change and support reform agendas while the project is being implemented. Leadership, team building and incremental capacity development are paid increasing attention by development practitioners. The World Bank has begun to consolidate this in the development of a “Science of Delivery”: applying implementation Know-How and Do-How derived from actual project execution and delivery in real-time. One such approach to embed this shift in development projects is the World Bank’s client country leadership development program, Leadership for Results Program (LforR). This approach is being applied to help develop state capabilities and country systems to quickly deliver results aimed for under the World Bank and government project.

This Technical Note illustrates how a government results-based program using LforR resources took shape in Sierra Leone in the context of a civil service reform project, modeling a process that could be used in other projects. A Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) change framework steered the LforR process of adaptive implementation to improve the process of project implementation and support the state’s capacity for delivering public services. The model of client-led project design and implementation throughout this project provides a practical example of how key principles of the PDIA framework can be operationalized in development projects. This Note describes this process in Sierra Leone in detail and provides lessons for future use of this innovative approach.

Key words: Sierra Leone, civil service reform, capacity development, leadership, implementation, ‘problem driven iterative adaptation’ (PDIA), ‘science of delivery’, results, Program for Results.
Acknowledgements:

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Table of Contents

1. FRAMING A NEW METHODOLOGY ................................................................. 4
   Context for Change ..................................................................................... 4
   Pay & Performance Project: Investment Project Finance Lending .................. 5
   Changing Environment for Client Support ................................................... 6
   Leadership for Results (LforR) Program ....................................................... 7
   Launching Leadership for Results in Sierra Leone ......................................... 8

2. IMPLEMENTATION STAGE ....................................................................... 10
   Pilot Phase ................................................................................................. 10
   Team Engagement ...................................................................................... 11
   Coaching .................................................................................................... 12
   Leadership Engagement ............................................................................ 13
   Monitoring and Evaluation ......................................................................... 13
   Results Achieved and Related Disbursements ........................................... 14

3. LEARNING TO ADAPT .......................................................................... 15
   Short cycle results and feedback loops ....................................................... 15
   Local Challenges, Local Solutions ............................................................. 16
   Key Lessons from Adaptive Implementation ............................................ 17
   Conclusion ................................................................................................. 20

Annex 1: Disbursement Linked Indicators by Year ........................................... 21
Annex 2: Sierra Leone: Rapid Results Approach Applied to the Pay and Performance Project 22
Annex 3: P&P Implementation Agencies’ Organogram .................................... 23
Annex 4: The Rapid Results Approach (RRA) ................................................. 24
Annex 5: Diagnostic Stage for Leadership Intervention ................................. 28

References ..................................................................................................... 30
1. FRAMING A NEW METHODOLOGY

Context for Change

1. The Government of Sierra Leone’s (GoSL) public service has faced seemingly intractable capacity constraints in the aftermath of its civil war. The lingering consequence was an inability to provide basic services to its citizens. This has tragically become an evidently urgent and dire situation in the context of, for example, poor health service provisions relating to the recent Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone and neighboring countries. Structural human resource reasons for an under-performing civil service (and consequent inadequate provision of public services) include a “missing” middle level of management within the civil service as well as a need for improved functioning of high-level leadership and strategic planning. Basic human resource issues also compromise service delivery, including: inadequate staff competencies, lack of intrinsic or extrinsic performance incentives, no formal performance appraisal system, non-meritocratic recruitment, inadequate pay, and poor external competitiveness.

2. At the same time, development partner programs offering independent short-term solutions had the unexpected consequence of displacing development of comprehensive medium to long-term solutions. In addition to these challenging circumstances, the government was facing rising pressure to decrease the wage bill of civil servants within the overall context of increasingly limited fiscal space (prior to the influx to government income from iron ore revenues). Such circumstances led to a strong desire by the country’s leadership to reverse the continual erosion of social service delivery by undertaking a broad-gauged civil service reform process.

3. The GoSL began to address this and approved a salary reform policy accompanied by a plan for a comprehensive public sector reform (PSR) action between 2009 and 2014, ‘Improving Productivity through Management and Pay Reforms’. However, the results of these initiatives were slow to materialize, and led to calls for deeper, more focused change by donors, civil service staff, country leadership, and the citizenry. Analysis\(^1\) of internal civil service stakeholders indicated awareness that change was about to take place, with a general belief in or commitment to change, but with different levels of confidence in the integrity and ability of key government actors to carry out any proposed reforms. Greater engagement of Permanent Secretaries and professional heads in key ministries (e.g., health, education) was perceived as vital to the success of any such initiative, although these executives were not involved in shaping the reform agenda.

4. Time and resources were sought to create a results-based culture of accountability in the Sierra Leone civil service—along with the necessary vision and focus on links between individual performance, program delivery, meeting beneficiary needs, and disseminating information about results achieved through citizen charters. Sustained support to the leadership of key government agencies was singled out by development partners as crucial to this based on their attempts at similar public sector reforms. UK Department for International Development, for example, previously attempted budget support for this and expressed skepticism about the degree to which DLIs could provide adequate incentives for the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), as well as other implementing partners, to work together to achieve common objectives.

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\(^1\) Koroma, Sidratu (2012). World Bank Rapid Assessment of Dynamics of Public Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, Freetown.
5. Expectations were high for dividends accruing to the population through improved services despite admittedly low capacity. To deal with capacity constraints linkages between better staffing policies and practices (recruitment, remuneration and performance management) and tangible development outcomes in priority sectors (e.g., health, education) had to be identified and solidified.

Pay & Performance Project: Investment Project Financing

6. In response to the government’s need to reform its civil service, and in support of efforts under the GoSL PSR program\(^2\) 2009-2014, the World Bank with the GoSL jointly prepared the Pay and Performance Project.\(^3\) The development objective was explicit: “to improve competitiveness in pay, performance management, and accountability, and increase recruitment of middle and senior staff in the civil service of Sierra Leone.”

7. The Bank and government converged in agreement upon use of an instrument that contained disbursement conditions along the lines of a results-based lending instrument.\(^4\) That would allow the GoSL to receive more fungible funds that would be transferred to the Consolidated Fund of the government, and that would help the Bank ensure it would not be supporting an unsustainable civil service wage bill and that would incentivize some progress against critical reform measures.

8. A set of conditions under a disbursement plan was developed and tied to specific results indicators--known as Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs)-- in a program results matrix (see annex 1). Incentives for achievement of results would be given to reach an overarching goal. Interventions focused on three areas: pay reform, recruitment and staffing, and performance management and accountability. The implementation of the government program was viewed as challenging and probably high-risk over the life of the Project. It also would require dedicated leadership to meet the challenges associated with this type of change.

9. The Project also included a Technical Assistance component to help support the client in achieving these indicators and results. In this results-based lending model, borrower implementation capacity is required to deliver specific results, outputs and outcomes so that funds may be disbursed to the client. Therefore, success depends both on capacity already existing within government agencies as well as necessary capacity for success of the project being developed in real-time, where necessary, during project implementation.

10. During the stages of the P&P project formulation with the World Bank, the operating environment in the country was considered, including government capacity, public financial management initiatives, decentralization work, and public sector reform initiatives more broadly. The Project was assessed as being risky by the World Bank and so diagnostic work was

\(^2\) The World Bank Sierra Leone Pay and Performance Project was based upon the government’s public sector reform program on “Improving Productivity Through Management and Pay Reform”, though this document was not finalized until the Project was well into the preparation process.

\(^3\) The P&PP is a US $17 million IDA-financed civil service reform project. The project has a US$15 million results-based component that disburses against the achievement of 15 disbursement-linked-indicators (DLIs), which mark important milestones and results along reform paths identified by the government team in each of the three reform areas. A US 2 million technical assistant component supports the achievement of these indicators by providing specialized consulting services and urgently needed physical inputs. Roseth and Srivastava, May 2013.

\(^4\) The project design was in the spirit of a Program for Results (PforR) lending instrument.
undertaken to determine the potential binding constraints to the public sector reform in the
country, and outline potential solutions to them. Critical challenges identified were the
insufficient capacity amongst those responsible for implementation and supervision, and the lack
of coordination amongst key agencies. It was evident from the project design phase that “the
intense level of engagement would need to be sustained (if not stepped up) during implementation
if the project is to achieve its potential.”

11. In the post-conflict, low-capacity context, and in light of a rapid assessment of the public
sector in Sierra Leone, Bank Operations invited the World Bank Institute Leadership Practice
to dialog with the government about ways to install the requisite capacity in “real-time”. A learning-
by-doing approach to support was envisaged to help ensure the GoSL could fully achieve its
planned outcomes. Subsequently, the World Bank Leadership for Results (LforR) program was
asked to support client implementation and develop capacity in key implementing agencies
throughout the project lifecycle.

Changing Environment for Client Implementation Support

12. As a “solutions bank”, the World Bank’s comparative advantage is in the range of
solutions it offers to address challenges that low-capacity countries face, at the moment they
in this respect, not only financing but the quality of Bank staff technical assistance and support in
developing capacity to deliver results becomes increasingly important. The LforR is one example within the World Bank of an approach that provides this kind of capacity support that is
required throughout many projects.

13. In support of this, and at a broader level, the Bank was also intent on fielding its own
development of an overarching approach (“Science of Delivery”) that would help guide staff as
they shifted from the more traditional role of project preparation and supervision, to focus more
on tangible support to government counterparts throughout the process of project implementation
to help clients achieve desired results. The Science of Delivery Team has been deconstructing
what it might take for the WBG to operate more along these lines: staff would need to “engage
with the client to diagnose problems, experiment, learn, course-correct, implement and deliver
multi-sectoral solutions.” It has also identified various components within projects that help

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5 The Bank realized that a considerable amount of trust-building was required with government counterparts and so it
invested in ‘face time’, including five two-week trips within eight months (much higher than average face-to-face client
6 Koroma, 2012.
7 The Leadership Practice is now situated within the Leadership, Learning and Innovation (LLI) Vice-Presidency
established in July 2014.
8 It sits within a much broader landscape of international development professionals and organizations trying to be
more supportive to clients and implementers throughout the most challenging part of their work – implementation and
delivery of real results. Much debate has also taken place within the broader international development community on
this issue: for example, the recently established ‘Doing Development Differently’ community that brings together
various international development partners to drive forward this shift in how development work is facilitated and
achieved in various contexts; and the Global Delivery Initiative established between GIZ and World Bank.
9 This requires incentives geared to reward solving problems versus taking projects to the Board, as well as a different
way to engage with management and the Board” – Available at: http://blogs.worldbank.org//voices/what-science-and-
what-delivery
10 Concretely, ‘Science of Delivery’ has been defined by the World Bank as having five components to help increase
success in the implementation and delivery of projects: (i) maintaining a relentless focus on citizen outcomes, defined
as measurable welfare gains of citizens; (ii) adopting multi-stakeholder approaches and coalitions for engagement and
participation; (iii) using, developing, collecting, contributing evidence to define problems, refine solutions, enable
‘course correction’, and support knowledge generation; (iv) leadership for change, including incentives to motivate,
increase success in the implementation and delivery of projects – particularly relevant to the Sierra Leone civil service reform relates to: (i) leadership for change, including incentives to motivate, political economy drivers of change and facilitating coalition-building, and; (ii) adaptive implementation that allows for iterative experimentation, feedback loops and ‘course correction’.

14. The LforR learning-by-doing approach, as described below, is in alignment with these operational framework shifts to enable to the World Bank to become a “solutions bank” and to support clients in implementation, focusing on leadership and adaptive implementation.

**Leadership for Results (LforR) Program**

15. In the World Bank, the client Leadership for Results (LforR) Program\(^{11}\) codified its approach to deliver performance results after a decade of experience supporting operational lending projects in different regions. This wealth of knowledge led to insights about how to apply and adapt specific implementation tools based on their complementarity to assist leaders and their teams in achieving project goals—especially during complex challenges. Given that “leadership contributes to change when it builds change space,” the LforR model simply creates the requisite organizational space for change to happen and then facilitates the change process among stakeholders over the life of the project\(^{12}\), in an adaptive and iterative manner. This action-oriented approach applies to leaders at each organizational level: strategic/political decision-makers, operational management, and team leaders.

16. The process offered by the LforR program support in Sierra Leone consists of:

(i) systematic use of a results-focused methodology - the Rapid Results Approach, RRA\(^{13}\) (see Annex 4) – which is used to develop better management techniques during implementation that assist government teams to deliver results. The methodology implements Rapid Results Initiatives\(^{14}\) (RRIs) – which are “small projects designed to quickly deliver mini-versions of the big project’s end results”\(^{15}\) in around 100 days. Through learning by doing, Rapid Results practitioners, including those from the World Bank and the Rapid Results Institute\(^{16}\), have recognized the value of ensconcing the RRI within the broader framework of project results frameworks. The RRA process “bonds itself to the established work program and timeline for Intermediate Results as well as agreed project DLIs—which are aligned to longer-term project goals—and supports engagement of strategic leaders in a forward-looking and backward-

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\(^{11}\) The Leadership for Results (LforR) program has undergone reform in the process from its transition within the World Bank Institute Leadership Practice to the Leadership, Learning and Innovation VPU created in July 2014. The program of support itself has evolved based upon learning and experiences from its implementation in recent years. The new program is named Collaborative Leadership for Development (CL4D).

\(^{12}\) Matt Andrews, 2010

\(^{13}\) The RRA was developed circa 1960 by Schaffer Consulting for private sector companies in the United States to enable them to quickly tackle and overcome hurdles towards attaining a project’s goal.\(^{17}\) The RRA was more recently, circa 2007, formally adapted by the Rapid Results Institute to support development projects of developing country governments in overcoming constraints to project implementation.

\(^{14}\) Please see Annex 4 for a more detailed description of the RRA and an RRI

\(^{15}\) See Matta and Ashkenas, 2003

\(^{16}\) Matta is the President and Founding Board Member (2007) of the Rapid Results Institute and a senior partner of Schaffer Consulting, the parent for-profit firm of the not-for-profit Institute.
planning process”.\textsuperscript{17} The process involves both team and leader coaching and training initiatives to help teams deliver on their own self-identified results chains. Beyond the tangible short-term results of an individual 100-day Rapid Result Initiative in achieving a DLI, the methodology supports the institutionalization and sustainability of skills and capacity acquired by adapting new approaches to getting things done, e.g., working in teams, collaborating across agencies, and encouraging innovative thinking to develop solutions when problems arise; and

\textit{(ii) Leadership fora} facilitated periodically during project implementation for political, strategic and operational leaders to jointly strategize, problem-solve, reinforce alignment with priorities, take decisions, and learn from international good practice. The intention in Sierra Leone was to link strategic decision-making with implementation realities of RRIs.

17. Given the complexity of implementation arrangements for the civil service reform project, as well as institutional fragmentation and low levels of inter-agency trust, implementation was expected to pose challenges for leaders at different levels as well as in various ministers throughout the civil service.

\section*{Launching Leadership for Results in Sierra Leone}

18. At the request of the P&P Project’s government agency counterparts LforR program began in March 2012 to support key project Implementing Agencies in delivering specific results. Agencies included the Public Sector Reform Unit (PSRU), the Human Resources Management Office (HRMO), and the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). The LforR engagement was prepared using a collaborative and inclusive approach for government counterparts at various levels of government in several agencies so that they themselves could develop a platform on which results-focused dialog and capacity building at the working level could take place, including collective problem-solving among the leadership cohort. This yielded three important benefits:

- reassuring stakeholders of their ability to achieve DLIs through initial piloting plus the demonstration effect of results;
- providing a system for monitoring implementation and solving problems in real-time to meet scheduled DLI timelines; and
- establishing the basis for results coaching during implementation to motivate capacity development within and across implementation teams.

19. At a broad level, the program was designed to strengthen leadership capacity for reaching agreed goals by means of coaching throughout implementation, as well as by convening leadership-level retreats supporting a two-pronged, learning-by-doing process as mentioned above (namely through (i) \textit{systematic use of a results-focused methodology and structured team coaching} and (ii) \textit{facilitating leadership fora for dialogue}). This design was also informed by key principles contained within the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) change framework (Andrews \textit{et al.}, 2012) for creating a space for change and facilitating an iterative process throughout implementation that also helped teams develop their own solutions and learn from their own experiences through coaching and feedback loops.

20. The relatively short timeframe for achievement of DLIs lends itself to a short feedback loop to facilitate rapid experiential learning for both government and World Bank staff about

\textsuperscript{17} Moira Hart-Poliquin, 2012
what results were actually achieved by using a phased approach with frequent reviews (e.g., quarterly). RRIs provide structured support to implementation results delivery and learning by doing. Combining RRIs with periodic leadership forums facilitated to review and assess these initiatives guides implementers going forward and increases the likelihood of project success - which is phased, results-focused, and client-driven as well.

21. The role of leaders in creating the required organizational space for change and innovation was also emphasized. This was to demonstrate the benefits of shared (team-based) leadership and joint accountability to overcome seemingly intractable organizational constraints, such as recruitment to fill priority vacancies—a joint effort by MoFED, PSC, and HRMO. Each agency was to be mutually accountable to the other for specific results against measurable outcomes. During this process, skills were acquired to build requisite capacity for team adaptation and innovation, and to illustrate commitment to change and accountability for results.

22. As the process began with the launch of a pilot phase, leaders of key Implementing Agencies (IAs) judged if the initial pilots were valuable, and, if so, the process would be ramped-up in all of them, and potentially across sectors, or sub-nationally, i.e., into line ministries by linking improvements in performance of civil servants to improved outcomes in service delivery for citizens. A pre-condition for success of any ramp-up was top-level engagement. This was to require a formal endorsement of the approach by the project’s Leadership Team identified in the project design—or at least endorsement and support of the Project coordinating agency—the Public Sector Reform Unit (PSRU)–to demonstrate commitment to achieving results. Their role is to endorse initiatives, monitor implementation status in multiple initiatives, and deal with obstacles to achieving results.

23. In essence, the LforR program aimed to provide a structure to deliver results and then combined it with forums for communicating and consolidating commitment to priority actions among leadership during high-level meetings, meant to address bottlenecks that teams lacked authority to resolve. Of importance is that the leadership team was also expected to inform the Head of State about key breakthroughs and significant institutional changes that are taking place in public sector reform generally. This combined process helped leverage implementation of short-term measures on the critical path for broader systemic change for strengthening government capacity to implement a broader Public Sector Reform program.18

24. The program approach was broadly supportive of the Project’s “working with the grain”19 strategy to use existing country systems - rather than create or transplant an external, artificial Project Implementation Unit (linked to the World Bank) - and reinforced the joint working objective of the government to implement a results-focused project that would encourage joint accountability and, ultimately, help develop country systems.

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18 Hart-Poliquin, 2012
19 Booth, 2009
2. IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

To provide a brief overview: the results-based process began by unpacking initial activities detailed in the Pay and Performance project design to make them operational, clarifying roles and responsibilities towards reaching objectives, and assessing additional capacity requirements in order to support development of the implementing agencies. The process deepened incrementally over a two-year engagement in the delivery of results for the project. The first phase focused on capacity building blocks to provide a solid foundation for broader and deeper systemic changes. The real-time demonstration effect gave leaders and their teams the platform to scale up results. It also generated credibility and confidence among key government agencies that they could actually meet the rising expectations of public service beneficiaries. The client-driven change process, in turn, enabled government to obtain funding from the World Bank by meeting agreed results indicators (Disbursement-Linked Indicators), which then triggered disbursements intended to support institutional strengthening that would subsequently improve public service delivery.

Pilot Phase

25. Since 2004, the World Bank and GoSL Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) provided first-hand experience to government leadership in Sierra Leone with Rapid Results Approach (RRA) until 2009. They experienced the benefits of implementing targeted RRIIs and facilitating high-level retreats to consolidate and strategize as the project evolved. Building on interaction with the government on this, the design and priorities of the LforR Program were developed at the request of the Minister of Finance in 2012 and core

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<tr>
<th>Table 1: Expected Outcomes through support from the Leadership for Results Program</th>
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<td>1. Outcomes for Government in Public Sector Reform:</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Improved project (and eventually development) effectiveness, along with enhanced government capacity, through introducing a new form of implementation support that is well-suited to accompany the needs under results-based programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Lessons learned on managing resistance to change through building confidence of stakeholders by using new methods and tools – such as the Rapid Results Approaches (RRA), coaching performance appraisal tools, new recruitment approaches, etc.</td>
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<td>2. Capacity Development Outcomes for Civil Servants:</td>
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<td>▪ Competencies of leaders at different levels: these would be developed in such a way to be relevant for implementation in any sector. They include competencies to foresee the implementation path through the life of a program, identification and mitigation of potential obstacles, working across teams and with leaders to unblock obstacles, especially at the political level, and learning from implementation in real time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Coaching skills to help manage change: these would be fostered within different ministries through action learning, networking with other countries, and the possibility for LforR high-level events to facilitate the development of capacity for RRA, for Results-based management (RBM), and for leadership coaching in areas such as strategic communication, negotiations, and conflict resolution.</td>
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(Moira Hart-Poliquin, April 2012).
members of the P&P Project Leadership Team. It commenced by launching some upfront Rapid Results Initiatives in Year 0 and Year 1 DLIs. This was considered the most effective support mechanism to jump-start actions. Most participants welcomed the idea of helping agencies catch up on steps needed to meet Year 0 DLIs, which were planned to begin January 2012 but had not begun serious implementation even by April 2012. The idea was to intertwine the leadership role and engagement in implementation with more frontline middle management during the early project stages. In response, the LforR team delivered a training session on the RRA to staff within key implementing agencies in early June, with Rapid Result Initiatives (RRIs) aligned with DLIs and launched by team leaders by end June. Orientation and familiarization of staff with the design and content of the Project, and their role in achieving its objectives, was a critical part of the training component.

26. The pilot phase in implementation was important to the success of the project for two reasons, according to the principles of the PDIA change framework:

(i) it signals the legitimacy of the achievements of the local civil servants (and other community actors, where applicable), and shows that progress is possible in their context using self-identified goals and solutions, rather than making an “appeal to external policies and programs that have been deemed to work elsewhere” (“isomorphic mimicry,” or “transplanting preconceived and prepackaged best-practice solutions”);

(ii) it demonstrates results in a short period, i.e., experiential learning can be captured quickly, fed back into the design for new solutions to use in subsequent initiatives; moreover, the cycle for iteration to develop next steps is shorter and more substantive than in post-facto project evaluations, where typically a mid-term review of the Project must occur followed by two or more years of implementation, or even project close to learn and apply new learning.

27. The LforR approach aimed to support government and address this in two key ways: launching short-term results-focused Rapid Results Initiatives that would show progress quickly and would be aligned to longer-term achievement of DLIs; and facilitation of review sessions and leadership-level dialogue to review progress and learning, problem-solve, make strategic decisions based on the short RRI cycle feedback loops, and course-correct where needed to move forward.

28. There were several components contributing to the success of the pilot phase which will be unpacked below: team engagement; coaching support; leadership engagement; and, monitoring and evaluation. These all played their part in facilitating the achievement of results under the project and in the release of disbursement funds from the Bank to the government.

**Team Engagement**

29. Lack of confidence and motivation typically is a major constraint for the implementers (or “front-line workers”) of World Bank/government projects—who generally have “not been part of the conversation about change” and “have no incentive to contribute ideas about how
things could be improved.” In this instance, the LforR process engaged strongly with, and empowered the RRI teams to become part of the discussion on changes and how they should happen.

30. For example, Mr. Mohamed R. Koroma (Director of Strategy and Planning in the HRMO and team leader of RRIs) was highly appreciative of the value-added in the work-planning phase of the RRIs, and believes it “brings focus to activities and increases the sense of ownership of teams over the milestones and DLIs in the P&P Project,” since teams go through a process of “designing the plan and the timelines for themselves,” so they become part of the conversation and the design of how to make change happen. This sentiment was echoed by Ms. Daphne Young (Head of Selection and Development of the PSC and team leader of RRIs) in September 2012, who captured this same thought: “there has been a beautiful articulation of the project, its milestones and DLIs by government leadership and World Bank, but the key is in its implementation and how we, in our teams, actually go about making these changes.”

31. These middle-level operational managers and leaders of RRIs have empowered front-line workers in their team through delegation of responsibilities and team building. Their successes also indicate that goals designed by the government during Project preparation were well aligned with the needs of local agencies (as opposed to the recommended solutions proposed from successes in other countries), and were realistic within the local context and institutional parameters. In addition, throughout the pilot phase, innovation occurred within teams during implementation to meet results statements. This created space for novelty, and the innovative contributions of local agents were not crowded out. The local efforts and solutions to challenges were captured throughout implementation and fed back into the design of initiatives going forward. For example, in PSC the teams held civil service examinations on Saturday and double-shifted when they received many more applicants than anticipated. Another example, is the PSRU M&E specialist travelling to individual MDAs with a flash drive to collect data from them when the internet wasn’t functioning.

Coaching

32. Recruitment of a Rapid Results coach was key to the process of engagement, empowerment, and facilitation of innovative problem solving with local teams. This is based on additional feedback from key counterparts in government IAs, who served as RRI team leaders, as well as from team members themselves. One of the most significant contributions LforR made to RRI implementation of DLIs was the recruitment of a Rapid Results coach based in Freetown and available to provide support to teams on a daily basis. The coach needed to be highly experienced in supporting Rapid Results Initiatives, and quickly get up to speed on the complex issues and challenges confronting the P&P project implementation.

33. The LforR team member explored ways to identify a coach with the director of the Decentralization Secretariat. This body had previously implemented the RRA between 2004 and 2009, and thus had access to a network of trained and experienced candidates, one of whom was recruited. The immediate task was to undertake a mid-point review of RRIs underway, as well as

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22 Ibid, p.6
23 Ibid, p.5
24 Based on experience, coaching support provided by the original recruited coaches in April – who were based in Sudan and Rwanda – was not able to quickly enough (given distance) respond to the day-to-day needs of the government teams, and were perceived as externals not as well situated to understand the day-to-day dynamics and challenges in government.
to re-focus and re-energize teams to ensure their continuing engagement in delivering the DLIs. This coach had local in-depth understanding of government and public sector reform: she was able to hit the ground running and connect with teams and gain their trust. This created a space where they could be more innovative, take risks in doing things differently, and venturing outside the traditional “group think” dynamic that can be a risk in large bureaucracies and government.

34. Mr. Ansu Tucker, Director of Human Resource Planning and Budgeting of the HRMO, and team leader of RRI, confirmed in September 2012 that this coaching was central to helping teams “contextualize their thinking” to “understand the logic between milestones, DLIs and outcomes” and “translate these concepts into action-oriented terminology for the teams themselves to move forward with concrete steps,” knowing that they were supported along the way in their efforts.

35. With the growing complexity of steps to be completed for each DLI, and as the teams became more embedded in implementing the Project, the need for an additional coach arose. A second coach was recruited from the cohort of trained coaches (from the decentralization project 2005-2009) and now coordinates with the initial coach who is now recruited by, and integrated formally into, the PSRU helping embed further local ownership over this project and the results needed.

Leadership Engagement

36. In complement to the coaching support at the more technical level of day-to-day implementation efforts, the LforR program staff facilitated high-level discussions between strategic leaders and members of the Leadership Team. Their participation in the mid-term review and final review of the pilot phase initiatives, as well as the one-day strategic leadership events, facilitated by WB LforR staff between leaders and implementation teams at critical points in the project (in June 2013 and February 2014), became pivotal orientation and decision-making events. These events helped connect project leaders with project implementers and enabled RRI team members to pose questions, request support, and ask for guidance from the strategic leaders; in turn, the leaders were able to understand better some of the day-to-day processes they needed to know be more effective.

37. These sessions also facilitated “the bottom to top, and top to bottom communications” (M.R. Koroma, March 2013), which does not always happen in individual agencies, let alone across agencies, or between leaders and from leaders to teams and vice-versa. They also helped individuals in teams as well as in formal leadership positions realize that, “we’re not going through this alone. Sometimes we wonder when sitting in our office why others are doing this to us and making our life difficult, but when we come together like this and talk about it, it helps to understand the other persons perspective and realize they’re also in [the] same boat (Daphne Young, March 2013). Others reported their realization that “we have 360 degree leadership: everyone is a leader in helping drive things forward,” rather than passing the buck and waiting for others to act. They learned from these events what each other was working on and who could help them with what, making them proactive in seeking assistance to advance their work.

Monitoring and Evaluation

38. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is another area where the LforR program helped support learning and subsequent gains in performance throughout implementation of an RRI. This
took the form of increased emphasis on M&E and tracking of progress and achievement at the micro-level and on a short-term basis. However, while tracking of progress of RRIs helps mobilize teams and engage leaders and beneficiaries, M&E has not been used to gauge how the overall reform is progressing in terms of impact that reaches beneficiaries due to improved service delivery. It is too early perhaps in the civil service reform to realistically measure this – and it is considerably more downstream that it becomes difficult to make it attributable to the project’s activities and priority objectives. Nevertheless, one valuable resource is the experience of the Rapid Results coaches in facilitating the engagement and problem solving of leaders at multiple levels in the system with team-level work. Political and strategic leaders have been able to deepen their understanding of the change process at a more granular level using data gathered by applying this tool, which tracks the micro process of achieving RRIs in the broader political context of change and reform. Teams also used tracking graphs to show to others - in visual form - the weekly progress. These graphs can be helpful in depicting when activities plateau, and can help in connecting these plateaus to blockages elsewhere in the system (i.e., fund flows, NASSIT social security numbers) that signal areas for remedial action.

Results Achieved and Related Disbursements

39. By February 2014, after 20 months of implementation, the HRMO and the PSC, supported by PSRU, achieved the following hard results:

(i) **Recruitment to fill critical vacancies**: Recruitment of 137 new civil servants to fill priority vacancies to execute critical functions of the government: Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Food Security, Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and National Fire Services;

(ii) **Performance Management process introduced**: Finalization of new performance management guidelines and appraisal forms (none existed previously), and training on these provided to 230 officials (permanent secretaries and HR managers and staff) by the Performance Management team. A first cycle of personnel appraisals is now being completed as part of a shift towards accountability and support for improved performance;

(iii) **Human Resource Planning**: Completion of manpower hearings and finalization of a remuneration survey by the Human Resource Planning consultancy team to better plan for recruitment needs in the following year. The purpose of the remuneration survey was to help determine whether some jobs to be recruited need to be given a market premium;

(iv) **Cleaning up the payroll**: Payroll cleaned and ongoing improvements to its integrity, including preparation of a comprehensive list by grade of all civil service employees (19,733) for each ministry. Ongoing effort to ensure movement and changes to the payroll for appointments, promotions, transfer resignations, dismissals, and retirement are supported and recorded by adequate documentation. Issuance of 1477 NASSIT (social security) numbers (of the 2,000 required) from AGD for new civil service personnel, with approximately 523 still outstanding; and,

(v) **Communications with citizens**: Dynamic interactive website launched for the Public Sector Reform Unit to communicate with citizens on progress being made under the Project, as well as presentation and facilitation of local forums to discuss issues, and radio discussions by experts, with call-in questions from citizens.
40. The achievement of these results meant that the Bank was able to disburse to the Government approximately US$8.9 million of project funds by June 2014.

41. In terms of soft results, all teams affirmed that there are now stronger inter- and intra-agency collaboration and increased trust and communication. The former Director of the PSRU in September 2012, and by the current Director of the PSRU in October 2013 noted that inter-agency collaboration definitely increased while implementing Year 0 and Year 1 DLIs. RRI teams reported that the Rapid Results intervention led to a common understanding of how the work of all teams is intertwined, and demonstrated how efforts are mutually supportive in achieving overall Project goals. Various teams also reported that the RRI set-up encouraged work across teams and across agencies, as many of the RRIs instilled joint accountability between ministries and are dependent on each other for their success. For example, the payroll integrity team in HRMO achieved some of its objectives specifically because of the recruitment of officers under the remit of the PSC recruitment team. Teams attested to the facilitative role of the coach as a key mechanism for helping them understand the value of weaving together the strands of the P&P Project across agencies, keeping them motivated despite challenges, and using this process as an opportunity to learn from each other.

3. LEARNING TO ADAPT

Short cycle results and feedback loops

42. The short cycle of holding facilitated review sessions of team progress approximately every 100 days – and convening all teams, relevant agencies and their leaders in one place has helped facilitate reflection on their own work, as well as how it fits within the broader picture in relation to the work of the other RRI teams present. It has helped teams to ‘shrink the change’, as expressed by Ms. Mary Rogers in the newly created Performance Management Department, March 2013: “sometimes an activity in the Project seems so enormous it feels overwhelming, but with RRIs we’re able to have those results statements broken down into smaller activities we feel better able to handle - we are able to bite what we can chew.”

43. This purposefully orchestrated phased approach to implementation has facilitated short feedback loops and learning around specific changes in teamwork and engagement with other agencies (for example engaging with Accountant General Department, Ministry of Finance and between project implementing agencies as described above) that can become institutionalized as a new way of working together.

44. Perhaps more importantly than this, however, it has helped individuals and teams overcome the uncertainty and inertia around whether the reform is possible, and give them confidence that they themselves have within their own agencies the capacities to problem-solve and make progress in their own part contributing to the broader-scale reform in the civil service. As Mr. Mohamed R. Koroma, Director of Strategy and Planning in the HRMO and team leader of RRIs stated in June 2013: “This program has brought us all together under one umbrella - it’s a very big step we’ve taken...We must emphasize lessons learned from the process in the past year and more...The point is we had to bring everyone on board and everyone has now been brought on... I’m very hopeful and happy for the level of collaboration we have attained and I’m quite sure that whatever challenges we have on disbursements is just a delay – but money will

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come...we will re-strategize and try to achieve our aims. We’re not heading for failure – yes, delays are there, but now let us focus on lessons learned. In payroll integrity our main lesson was that we didn’t know the resources in terms of human capacity that we had in our team: our staff can think fast and make things happen where there is difficulty – we came up with answers ourselves.”

Local Challenges, Local Solutions

45. Drawing on its own strengths (and evidencing the operationalization of the PDIA) the government sought its own solutions to its own specific challenges - the major one of which was the funds flow. Yet the government, through collaboration across agencies and perseverance at each step in the system, was able to solve the challenge and improve its country systems through this process.

46. Initially, local challenges arose that were beyond the control of the teams but were crucial to their success. Most common were delays in agency allocations from the Ministry of Finance. As the Project was designed to be executed using country systems (i.e., without a specific Project Implementation Unit to distribute funds from the World Bank), funds flowed through required government bodies, e.g., Treasury and Ministry of Finance. A staff member at the PSC in September 2012 observed that “Rapid would be out of Rapid Results Initiatives without sufficient resources.” The PSC and HRMO faced significant budgeting challenges and struggled to push forward with their initiatives. By end September 2012, PSC still had not received the budget allocation for the second quarter of the year due March 2012; and the HRMO had only just received the second quarter allocation. The lack of funds available on a timely basis significantly impacted RRI progress. As Mr. Koroma explained in October 2012, “we cannot be certain when the money will come to do the next step in the RRI, and so the RRI flounders.”

47. By June 2013, however, progress was made in this regard, with disbursements from the World Bank received by the government consolidated fund in April 2013. Yet, the next challenge was for these funds (or a portion of them) to reach the IAs and teams of this project. This did not happen until June showing that the ‘country systems’ require focused efforts for improvement in funds flow, and that significant learning was needed from this first blockage to make the necessary improvements. Emerging from the mid-point review of early June was the message that despite the disbursement, the long delays before receiving funds in PSC and HRMO had delayed them in implementing various activities in their work-plan. While unfinanced activities had advanced (e.g., long-listing and short-listing candidates for recruitment), activities with cost implications, such as training and printing appraisal forms, had been held up. Nonetheless, once they received funds, they re-doubled their efforts to speed up progress - for example in PSC they accelerated the interviewing process for recruitment by operating on Saturdays. Additional messages emerging from teams included: awareness of the shrinking size of the Performance Management team and the need to address this quickly given the anticipated workload in coming months; requests for training on leadership techniques for strategic leaders for supporting teams; increasing delegation and individual responsibilities to support workflow within the teams; and distribution of new equipment within the agencies (following recent allocation from PSRU).

48. Messages from the mid-point review percolated upward into a Strategic Leadership Interactive Session held in June 2013, bringing together Project Leadership as well as other development agencies (EU, UNDP) that were also working on civil service reform. This provided a platform for on-boarding of new leaders who had been appointed to head the HRMO and the PSRU earlier in 2013 (following presidential elections in November 2012). Ensuring continuity
for the work of the implementing teams through maintaining support of their leadership was a critical function of this session. It helped to bring them up-to-speed quickly and inform them of issues and challenges needing focused attention. It also served to share donor perspectives also working on civil service reform, provided an update the RRI from the mid-point review, and shared questions, contributions and discussions of staff with their new leadership and other donors. A key outcome was the very public expression of commitment by the Budget Director to all operational staff under this project who were dependent upon his allocations that they could hold him accountable. He was nominated as the focal point in the Ministry of Finance, to facilitate timely transfer of government funds to the agencies—even though fund flow problems occurred and accountability vigilance needs to be maintained. A second outcome was appreciation of lessons learned by government agencies, which went through a steep learning curve within the PSRU and AGD in transferring funds and procuring equipment under the TA. This is expected to lead to smoother implementation of processes in future.

49. The main message is that despite fund flow constraints, the teams found ways to continue their efforts. It also illustrates how the local challenges accompanying delayed flow of funds were eventually overcome with local solutions created by the affected bodies. At times throughout the process of facilitating collaboration and creative problem-solving using teamwork, coaching and leadership platforms, the challenges seemed surmountable. In the end, the Budget Director in MOFED was officially nominated in June 2013 to oversee funds flow for the P&P Project and indicated that the “issue of delays should not be a pointer on why we would fail. It actually gives us opportunity to think on how to do things better. For the first time we are using existing country systems – we therefore have to set up a system that is capable of meeting the needs of MDAs and that facilitates flow of funds from outside donors more efficiently. But we won’t get it right first time. It’s only now that we know the real challenges, having tried to do this in past months, that we have been able to learn from it and what is needed. We will be faster next time and we will work with the three RRI teams so we will together achieve the DLIs.”

Key Lessons Learned from Adaptive Implementation

50. The political economy evolved following the design of the project. At the time (late 2011/early 2012), US$15-17 million seemed a sufficient incentive to strive for results; however, since then government income projections have grown substantially because of an iron ore boom. In retrospect, US$1 million per DLI had a greater incentive effect to MoFED at the start of the project, when the government faced severe budget constraints. Now that the iron ore revenues are coming on stream, US$1 million has less incentive value. Real GDP growth increased to 15.2% in 2012 after expanding by 6% in 2011, due to the commencement of iron ore production. It is important to take into account how substantially increased national revenue influences the level of motivation for government to focus on achieving DLIs. However, despite the disbursement amounts to MoFED, the key implementing agencies of PSC and HRMO are very much still engaged in the project for reasons of wanting to improve the functioning of their own institutions and the services they provide. The dedication and commitment of the Chairman of PSC, the Director-General of HRMO and the Director of the PSRU, and their staff, is ongoing and impressive.

51. Adapting to the political reality is paramount following the change in leadership in the national elections in November 2012, as well as the transitions throughout government by people changing posts. In this case, the director of the PSRU as well as the Director General of HRMO

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changed after election. Moreover, the chairman of the PSC is retiring. All three were key leaders and transitioned out following the design and initial implementation of the project. As part of the efforts under the LforR program, a process of documenting successes prior to the transition helped with gaining buy-in from new leaders to become supportive of the existing work, and facilitation of an on-boarding leadership event for new agency leaders helped to mitigate the risk of any disruption to continuity of this work.

52. On the plus side, review sessions and documenting progress under the RRIs was key to keeping the teams together and moving forward at the operational level, including using middle management as RRI team leaders, to compensate for the effect of transitions at leadership level. Such mitigation measures must be built-in to keep the reform process on track and to preclude politics and transitions from neutralizing or reversing progress made. The focus on the middle management is vital to create the right environment where incentives can take hold and be sustained in the midst of external and internal leadership changes.

53. The pilot phase, introducing LforR, involved a scoping phase consisting of discussions with key leaders and assessment and agreement of what could be helpful. This was followed by an orientation session and launch of some RRIs. Because of the ‘missing middle’ in the civil service, LforR helped bridge this gap by facilitating communication and problem-solving between the leadership and the implementation/operational level.

54. The team-building component under each RRI added value by bringing together the right people to achieve the goals and orienting individual team members of their role in the overarching project objectives. Critically, it involved fostering a sense of ownership amongst these implementers (who had largely not been involved in project design discussions) to drive forward the steps along the reform path. Teams have been learning-by-doing themselves in real-time.

55. The LforR specifically facilitated leadership dialogue to engage the political level to help implementation, i.e., alleviating blockages at their level to help operational staff in RRI teams move forward and communicate successes upward at a national level.

56. Coaching of teams was critical. Having a core person who was able to help teams problem-solve, and to go between teams and assist communication flows within agencies, across agencies and have credible access to the strategic leadership in the Project was of immense help in boosting collaboration as well as tracking progress. One coach, initially recruited by the World Bank then later integrated into the PSRU, seems to have had greater traction in gaining access to leadership and in participating in critical project meetings within government than the coach that remains recruited by the World Bank. This is a point to note in terms of the coach effectiveness - that it may be more influential and impactful to work with a coach that is also internal to the government. The flip-side argument to that is, of course, that they lose their more ‘independent/neutral’ status from the government that can offer them space to act and perform a role that other civil servants are unable to fill.

57. LforR also facilitated regular feedback loops, both inside the RRIs and RRI review sessions, as well as between leadership and RRI teams, which help moving activities forward to the next step. This person in this project is the Rapid Results (RR) coach. Indicators for team achievements have been created under the RRI methodology. The RRIs have essentially made it easier to teams to scale down what the project requires into incremental stages that seem more achievable to them.
58. **Working with ‘country systems’** was introduced under the design of this project. There was no Project Implementation Unit and the MoFED and other key implementing agencies had to resolve blockages in the system of transfer of funds. As the Budget Director has remarked, the initial ‘teething problems’ have been confronted and learning from this process has taken place.

59. **DLIs must not be focused on to the exclusion of intermediate indicators.** The planned reform path was designed in such a way that achievement of the intermediate indicators act as building blocks towards fulfillment of higher-level DLIs. However, given that no fund disbursement is linked to intermediate indicators, implementing agency teams had a tendency to focus directly on working towards the DLI requirements. RRIs are one way in which implementing teams can pay more attention to goals on a smaller scale than DLIs. It is recommended to more strongly and purposively guide the focus of the RRI teams towards intermediate indicators right from the beginning of the effectiveness of the project. This is designed to lead to more sustainable change.

60. The **process of ‘course correction’ and adaptive implementation** reinforces what we already know: that civil service reform is not a linear process and does not conform to a project document designed at the beginning of the project - after which the reality of implementation sets in and the political economy of the country and incentives to deliver on the results may have waned (given the dramatic rise in income from extractive industries in the past couple of years). The flexibility of reviewing and adjusting of the results framework under the project - completed in April 2014, two years after its design - has allowed both the Bank and government to keep making progress to the best of the government's ability for the benefit of the citizenry while updating the intermediate result indicators and DLIs.

61. And so it was to be in the P&P Project: **A dialogue around Project restructuring was needed**, largely due to disbursement and budget allocation delays that held up implementation activities and to lack of progress on the ongoing challenge of mainstreaming Local Technical Assistants into the civil service. This process of dialogue and agreement, facilitated by the WB LforR staff, with the Leadership Team is considered as one way in which the Rapid Results Approach (RRA) helped the government and Bank gain insight about what worked and what did not, and how to incorporate more flexibility and responsiveness to change or adjust to what is realistic and achievable. Given the extremely challenging operating environment throughout 2013 (due to excessive spending prior to national elections in 2012), the project activities requiring to be completed that year suffered in their implementation. The LforR Rapid Results review sessions throughout the year helped to maintain an open dialogue with the government on actual progress (versus planned progress). The LforR facilitated Leadership Team dialogues that provided a platform for discussion and negotiation with leadership in key agencies on: (i) what may be realistically achieved on time; (ii) what may be achievable but with an extension of timeframe; and (iii) what is unlikely to be achieved. This cooperative environment between Bank and government allowed space for the government to express its requests and needs, and for the Bank to be responsive and responsible in making necessary adjustments to the project lending agreement. This was done in a timely fashion, having had a system for tracking progress and a

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27 “The issue of “mainstreaming” Local Technical Assistants (LTAs) is a challenge that spanned several World Bank projects [including the Integrated Public Financial Management Project 2009, IPFMRP]. LTAs were originally hired through donor-financed projects to temporarily supplement capacity in key government positions in several MDAs… and are remunerated at levels much higher than regular civil servants… the LTAs were retained by the government - at their elevated salaries - without ever having to compete for their positions…This has served to erode the esprit de corps…It has long been recognized that this issue needs to be addressed but almost no progress has been made”. Roseth and Srivastava (2013).
warning system well in advance that deliverables may be off-track in terms of what was planned within the project agreement (PAD).

**Conclusion**

62. The development community as a whole has been placing more emphasis on how to better support implementation of development projects. This paper has provided an example of this new approach in the context of a service reform in Sierra Leone. This project illustrated in a concrete way how different innovative instruments, approaches, programs, and tools can be operationalized in the P&P Project to enhance the capacity of civil servants and optimize the potential for successful development results.

63. The LforR approach is one such approach that supported development actors during the project cycle. It was operationalized using a theory of development that maintains that results are achieved most effectively by an iterative and adaptive process (PDIA) of learning-by doing in real-time. The incentives for adaptation and learning to support achievement are provided through the disbursement-linked indicators that provide funds to governments to continue their work. The capacity of civil servants was increased in real-time as they worked on specific outcomes to improve their country systems.

64. This paper has captured the process of World Bank support to government for implementation, and some achievements of key implementing agencies working on civil service reform in Sierra Leone. Much has been learned and documented in this paper, specifically, in terms of: interactions and discussions between the World Bank and government officials at various levels under this lending model. These include: how the incentive structure of DLIs play out in reality by implementation teams in government agencies; how development partners can support government along its reform path and develop capacity in real-time, and support the improvement of country systems and institutions; and the importance of continually bridging the gaps in communication and potential for problem-solving. The lessons learned from this process can be applied in other efforts in various development operations going forward. Underpinning this is a two-pronged approach that supports and brings together the strategic leadership and the project operational, technical staff and implementers. Expectations are that this model will be used to foster institutional learning and real-time capacity development in future projects across sectors.
## Annex 1: Disbursement Linked Indicators by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISBURSEMENT LINKED INDICATOR</th>
<th>ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED FOR DISBURSEMENTS IN YEAR 0 (THROUGH JUNE 30, 2012)</th>
<th>ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED FOR DISBURSEMENTS IN YEAR 1 (JULY 1, 2012 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2012)</th>
<th>ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED FOR DISBURSEMENTS IN YEAR 2 (CALENDAR YEAR 2013)</th>
<th>ACTIONS TO BE COMPLETED FOR DISBURSEMENTS IN YEAR 3 (CALENDAR 2014)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Pay reform</td>
<td>1.1) HRMO has conducted and completed a remuneration survey.</td>
<td>(1.2) All Civil Service jobs have been evaluated in accordance with a Job Evaluation Scheme and assigned to a Grading Structure approved by the CSSC. (1.3) 100% of Civil Servants in Grade 6 and above are paid in accordance with the approved Pay Structure.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Recruitment and staffing</td>
<td>2.1) The appropriate open, competitive and merit-based Recruitment Procedures have been designed by PSC in collaboration with HRMO and approved by CSSC. (2.2) Seven staff have been recruited to PSC and trained to manage recruitments and selection.</td>
<td>(2.3) At least 60% of Priority Vacancies have been filled in accordance with the Annual Recruitment Plans and the approved Recruitment Procedures. (2.4) At least 80% of Priority Vacancies have been filled in accordance with the Annual Recruitment Plans and the approved Recruitment Procedures. (2.5) LTAs have been integrated in accordance with an approved Mainstreaming Policy and Action Plan.</td>
<td>(2.6) At least 90% of Priority Vacancies have been filled in accordance with the approved Recruitment Plans and the approved Recruitment Procedures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Performance management</td>
<td>3.1) Appropriate guidelines for Performance Contract management for Civil Servants in Grade 11 and above in all Ministries prepared by HRMO &amp; approved by CSSC.</td>
<td>(3.2) All Pilot Ministries have completed one annual cycle of the Performance Appraisal Process for Civil Servants in Grades 7 to 10.</td>
<td>(3.3) At least 80% of annual Performance Appraisal Reports for CY 2014 for Civil Servants in Grade 7 to 10 in Pilot Ministries of appropriate quality. (3.4) At least 80% of annual Performance Reports for CY 2014 for Civil Servants Grade 11 and above on Performance Contracts in Pilot Ministries of appropriate quality. (3.5) All Ministries’ performances against Performance Targets evaluated jointly by the Recipient and relevant non-state actors. (3.6) Publication of: (i) all Ministries’ Performance Targets; and (ii) achievements against Performance Targets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Annex 2: Sierra Leone: Rapid Results Approach Applied to the Pay and Performance Project

- **Interviews and meetings conducted in April 2012** with Director of PSRU, DG of HRMO, Secretary to Cabinet and Head of Civil Service, Chief of Staff - discussions with all three technical teams on implementation challenges informed design of L4R intervention;

- **Team training delivered in June 2012** to implementing partners and operational stakeholders (45 persons trained) on Rapid Results Approach in order to create awareness of value-added of L4R for the P&P project and to generate draft work-plans for Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) to assist in delivery of results on DLIs.

- **Stakeholder orientation workshop conducted in June 2012** at which the refined work plans were presented to leaders to gain their buy-in for continued support throughout their implementation while creating team ownership.

- **International coaches helped form RRI teams in June 2012** and proposed an effective mechanism to carry the momentum forward and monitor progress.

- **National coach was recruited in October 2012** acting as a day-to-day and on-the-ground contact point for project management, team-building, monitoring and evaluation, problem-solving and communication flow.

- **Mid-Term review was conducted in November 2012** and provided an opportunity to reflect on progress made and, where necessary, they re-directed any areas needing adjusted, added and removed team members where helpful.

- **Final Review was conducted in March 2013** at which results achieved were discussed, experiences shared, lessons learned were harvested, discussion on how to move this forward in Year 2.

- **Launch event for second cycle of RRIs was held in March 2013** developing strategies for how to ensure Year 2 DLIs are met and breakdown for work-planning, designing team composition and attributing roles to team members.

- **Mid-Term Review of Second Cycle of RRIs** was held in June 2013 to track progress, determine any needs for refinement of planning, and agree actions required to overcome challenges encountered thus far to achieve goals on time.

- **Interactive Session on Strategic Leadership was held in June 2013** inviting leadership in the P&P Project as well as other development actors in civil service reform to facilitate discussion, agreement, and further refining of a strategy with commitment to action amongst these key actors to continue successes and move forward to achieve Year 2 DLIs, by further strengthened collaboration across implementing agencies and also including MOFED.

- **Final Review of second cycle RRIs and launch of third cycle RRIs was held in October 2013**

- **Mid-term review of third cycle RRIs held in February 2014** to bring together RRI teams to review progress in order to update leadership on potentially realistic and unrealistic achievements, requests for support and suggestions to leadership going forward.

- **Facilitated leadership meeting held in February 2014** to support open discussion on progress to date, challenges that risk non-achievement of DLIs, course correction around goals and timelines and potential need for project restructuring.

- **Leadership and team building training provided in February 2014** to address how all staff, regardless of hierarchy of job titles and grades, can exercise leadership - in an effort to mobilize people that must work together to enhance work across agencies in improving the country’s civil service.
Annex 3: P&P Implementation Agencies’ Organogram
Annex 4: The Rapid Results Approach (RRA)²⁸

The Rapid Results Approach (RRA) was developed by the private sector in the U.S. for the private sector to support improved performance and shareholder value and has been proven to strengthen implementation capacity, accelerate the achievement of concrete results, and introduce a culture of results for those organizations that use it. It is a methodology of good management techniques drawing on theory and principles of change, which has been used by Schaffer Consulting²⁹ for the past 50 years to facilitate change within organizations. It unleashes creativity and capacity, accelerates learning from years to 100 days and introduces basic management disciplines that allow efforts to succeed. It has been adapted by the Rapid Results Institute³⁰ to the developing country context for application within government ministries and is customized to each specific country situation. It has proven to be highly instrumental in changing attitudes, behaviors, and processes and, most critically, it has allowed governments through the ‘demonstration effect’ of successful service delivery projects to enhance their credibility amongst citizens. Its success depends heavily upon the commitment and engagement of leaders to explore new ways of doing business – with a unique focus on the attainment of concrete results while developing capacity through ‘learning-by-doing’.

Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) are “small projects designed to quickly deliver mini-versions of the big project’s end results”.³¹ RRIs are the engine that drives the RRA. RRIs support project implementation through a series of highly choreographed 100-day initiatives that produce highly ambitious and tangible results that can be leveraged to contribute to larger-scale reform/change processes. They are structured, team-based projects that are focused on results. In the short-term they are designed to release group adrenalin by launching action on a real challenge with a very ambitious goal. They are designed and owned by the team, and ideally, once achieved, will produce very tangible results within 100 days. In the longer-term, efforts are sustained and built upon, leading to new ways of working, stimulated innovation, more collaborative team work, and behavior changes within the team and, ultimately, the organization. Each project is completed within a short - and fixed - period of time, usually around 100 days, and is facilitated by a coach trained in implementing RRIs. At the outset, the RRI team establishes in a specific and measurable manner a stretch result, then undertakes the planning and monitoring of the initiative, and each team member effectively implements the required elements tasked to him or her to achieve the RRI goal.

Each RRI team has between 6 to 10 people who feel a real sense of accountability to perform at a higher level. Team members are identified and selected as being those who have a vested interest in the success of the RRI, as well as those whose collaboration will be required to make it a success. This normally includes cross-department, or cross-ministerial team membership, as often accomplishments are not possible working only within the realm of one department/ministry but require cross-support in completing the chain of actors to alleviate any

²⁸ See Schaffer and Ashkenas, 2005
²⁹ Further information available at: http://www.schafferresults.com/
³⁰ Further information at: http://rapidresultsinstitute.info/
³¹ Matta and Askenas, 2003
potential systemic blockages. In addition, it is highly beneficial to have as team members the intended beneficiaries of the desired RRI goal as this informs the design and execution of the initiative.

The team has a clear and compelling statement of what will be achieved – involving a result with a real impact, not an activity or an enabler. They have a work plan with steps to achieve the goal, involving experimenting with new strategies, ideas, or processes, or new ways of doing the same things. In essence, an RRI team is a temporary governance structure that undertakes an experimental process which includes team leaders, team members, a team coach, a monitoring and tracking system, weekly progress status updates, mid-course reflection and evaluation, and sustainability plans.

The main steps in implementing a Rapid Results Initiative (RRI) are:

SHAPING PHASE

1. Framing the Focus:
   - Clarification of the overall policies and strategies in which the RRI will be situated;
   - Affirmation that the RRI goal will generate a result which will contribute to the attainment of the desired outcomes of these policies and strategies;
   - Assuring commitment and engagement of highest level of leadership;
   - Identifying an appropriate local sponsor of the RRIs. This person can, for example, be the Minister of the relevant ministry under which the RRI will be launched. The sponsor is normally a person whose role is: (i) to identify the priority area of strategic importance to which RRIs may contribute; (ii) develop the initial strategy; (iii) to help people learn, develop skills, and exercise leadership all along the RRI cycle; (iv) to review the results of the RRI team at the final review session, and (v) begin to lay out plans for the next steps.
   - Identifying a Strategic Leader for the RRI. This person can be, for example, a Deputy Minister of or a Director General within the relevant ministry in which the RRI(s) will be launched. The Strategic Leader is normally a person whose role is: (i) to identify the desired outcome (within the priority areas identified by the sponsor) to which the RRI will contribute; (ii) to be an initial point of contact for supporting the RRI team (including freeing up resources) and alleviating blockages to their success; (iii) to mobilize and influence actors concerned by the RRI throughout the RRI cycle; (iv) to review the results of the RRI team at the mid-point and final reviews; (v) to collaborate with the sponsor on how the RRI team may move ahead in the next cycle and facilitate a smoother work environment for them to succeed, based upon lessons learnt from the previous RRI cycle.

2. Orientation and Prioritization Workshop: A large group of stakeholders are brought together to agree upon initial priority areas for action in which RRIs may be useful to jumpstart implementation and accelerate achievement of results. The areas identified by these stakeholders are ideally those around which there is a readiness and urgency to act and improve upon the current situation (what keeps them awake at night?)}
3. **Training of Rapid Results Coaches:** A workshop to train local rapid results coaches. The local coaches support rapid results teams on the process of applying the principles of Rapid

4. **Reinforcement work sessions:** These sessions are designed to help Rapid Results team leaders and strategic leaders to think strategically on how RRI can contribute to the achievement of the overarching policies and strategies, and to decide upon priority areas for which RRI can show initial concrete results. This is a necessary prior step to the launch workshop in terms of providing guidance to RRI teams during the launch workshop when they will design their RRI goal and work-plan. It helps ensure alignment between overarching strategies and desired outcomes, and the goal of the RRI team as a smaller part contributing to their achievement.

**IMPLEMENTATION PHASE**

5. **Workshop to Launch Rapid Results Initiatives:** The Rapid Results team leader and members identify their 100-day RRI goals and develop there work plans to accomplish these goals. The launch is the event, which marks the effective start date of the RRI. The RRI goal fixed by the team and aligned with priorities defined by leaders must be challenging but achievable, clearly specified, measurable, meaningful value for the beneficiaries. Most of all the team must be excited and proud, be prepared to work very hard and solve problems rather than succumbing to them. The work plan outlines the respective responsibilities of each team member.

6. **Progress Management and Monitoring:** The team must ensure that it executes its work plan, and so it implements monitoring mechanisms which allow it to adjust its actions, if necessary, either in terms of operations between the team members, or in terms of more complex matters such as milestones towards the RRI goal, or revision of the RRI goal itself Tools such as tracking charts, individual follow-ups by the coach and team meetings are introduced and utilized to assist in monitoring progress.

7. **Reviews: Mid-Term and Final:** The reviews constitute major events at which the progress of the RRI team towards achievement of their RRI goals are reviewed by the Strategic Leader and sponsor. These events are also, and almost more importantly, an opportunity to review the changes and improvements in work methods, communications and team behaviors that may have been fostered through operating under a new culture of focusing upon results and which have been adopted during the RRI process. This is significant in terms of changes within individual team members, within RRI teams, and over time can have implications for positive changes at the institutional level.

**SCALING-UP – INSTITUTIONALIZATION PHASE**

If the government judges the initial set of pilot initiatives as valuable, the process can be scaled up within a sector, across sectors, or sub-nationally, whichever is relevant. If scaling up is to succeed, top-level engagement is a necessary condition. In some countries this takes the form of a formal endorsement of the approach from the head of state as a demonstration of his commitment to achieving results on national priorities. In other countries it takes the form of a
decree from the council of ministers, or even the setting up of a special cross-ministerial unit, sometimes in the presidency.

In most cases the appointment of a steering group at the ministerial, head of organization level (sometimes represented by proxies) is an important step for sustained operational effectiveness. Their role is to endorse initiatives, monitor implementation status across multiple initiatives, address critical obstacles and share innovative solutions. Most importantly, they are expected to appraise the head of state of key breakthroughs and important institutional changes taking place. To expand interest, they can sponsor workshops to share lessons across ministries, which in many contexts have proven to be considerably valuable.
Annex 5: Diagnostic Stage for Leadership Intervention

Leading and Facilitating the Space for Change in LforR Program Design (by Moira Hart-Poliquin, April 2012)

It seemed no single leader with sufficient access, skill and influence was in a position to champion the process for mobilizing around results, negotiating conflict and innovative solutions. There was a clear need to strengthen the team of leaders (Leadership Team) by convening them, building their confidence and providing coaching where needed. Skills in results-based management techniques were also needed to link human and financial management with outcomes.

There seems to be a lack of strong conviction amongst the Leadership Team to do what it takes to trump obstacles that have presented themselves in the past (this was underlined during the Bank project preparation phase and is proving true, for example, the mainstreaming of the Local Technical Assistants which had been cancelled from a previous World Bank/GoSL project). And last but not least, there appeared to be an aversion to risk-taking and reluctance within certain implementing agencies of the Project to delegate - which needed to be addressed as a priority in the forthcoming LforR intervention.

Leadership capacity

From an organizational perspective, no single leader appears sufficiently engaged and strong enough to access and invoke the political will of the president and champion the entire process including implementation across the Cabinet. The President is also the minister for the public service but sees his role more from the perspective of driving delivery of final results, not intermediate ones.

The leader for this reform is the Minister of Finance. While verbally supportive, he has many other pressing political and operational obligations. The Director of PSRU has the mandate but needs support to gain the access and influence vis-a-vis the cabinet and the president. PSs are not sufficiently influential to overcome resistance or be held accountable for service delivery at the end of the chain.

Project Communication, Collaboration and teamwork

The level of trust and effectiveness of the dialogue between the Ministry of Finance and other ministries on budget, planning and allocation was raised as a concern that constrains development effectiveness across the board. The effects of limited teamwork were evident through the process of project preparation, though following on from, and as a result of, this process improved communication and collaboration is reported by PSRU, amongst others. Even the stakeholders express concern that implementation can be compromised if it’s anything like the experience they had in the preparation phase. This was considered to be a priority area of focus for support and facilitative assistance from the LforR program.
Formal and Informal Authority

Selectivity in cultivating the seeds and reaping the results accruing to public sector reform where political will is strong is critical. For example, the Free Healthcare program and related salary reform for health care workers benefited strongly from presidential sponsorship. Where the president chooses to invest his capital, things get done. In the long-term the LforR program was designed to help build capacity for ensuring a portfolio of results that can assist in leveraging the attention of the President towards civil service reform.
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