

# **MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTIONAL REVIEW OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

**PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM UNIT 2004**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Following an Output to Purpose Review of the UK sponsored Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) undertaken in July 2002, the Review Team identified that many of the systems developed during the early days of SILSEP for the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence (MOD) were not fully understood or accepted by the organization's staff. It was agreed with senior management locally and the UK Commander IMATT that this would be an appropriate time to review the organization, structure and processes of the Ministry, particularly in the light of the UNAMSIL draw down from Sierra Leone in 2004 and the planned reduction in personnel of the RSLAF (Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces) by 2007. As part of the Department for International Development (DFID) continuing programme of support for the Government of Sierra Leone's (GOSL), DFID agreed to commission a study into this work. This report covers a review carried out by a joint team of Sierra Leonean and DFID consultants during October and November 2003 of the functions, structures and management arrangements at the Ministry of Defence.

2 The report acknowledges that much work has been undertaken at MOD in the past three years in creating the institutional and working environment in which military and civilians work together within a framework of democratic government. The restructuring and internal scrutiny processes currently being developed are designed to ensure the MOD is equipped to meet the challenges that lie ahead in providing necessary direction and support to the RSLAF. It was equally evident during this study that the Ministry still relies heavily on the expertise and support provided by IMATT personnel. The real test will come in the future when this support is no longer available in its present form and IMATT officers operate in an advisory rather than in line management roles.

3. Attention is drawn in the report to the wide disparities that exist between civilian and military staff in terms of grading and remuneration. In some instances, military staff are paid over 400% more than their civilian colleagues occupying posts at the same level. The report recommends that the Establishment Secretary's Office be asked to undertake an evaluation of the senior civilian posts in the structure to assess and determine the appropriate grading for the positions in question.

4. A major task for the DFID Review Team during this study was identifying, validating and recording the various functions arising from the restructuring and reorganization of MOD. This data has been included, for ease of reference, in a separate document to this report. Prior to the Review Team's arrival, the Ministry had been examining its future command structure and proposed to rationalize work activities in five one star commands at MOD. The Defence Policy and Operations Committee (DPOC), chaired by the Deputy Minister, had approved this arrangement shortly after the start of this study. We reviewed the mix and match of functions identified by MOD for the individual commands and have put

forward for consideration two further options for grouping of functions that in our view would provide for a more even and effective balance of activities and working arrangements. We have recommended that Option1 should be adopted.

5. Other key recommendations include:

- The need to develop an annual management plan setting out key MOD objectives, priorities, resource inputs, outputs envisaged as well as timescales and assigned responsibility for delivery of specific activities.
- Existing legislation in the Defence sector should be updated.
- Budgetary structures should be reviewed to show proposed expenditure within each directorate. In addition, requirement processes should be put in place to scrutinize, review and agree needs and priorities as well as procedures developed to monitor and manage activity or programme performance against budget.
- The internal audit process should be strengthened and the Office of the Auditor General should be asked to undertake an audit of MOD during 2004.
- The procurement process should be reviewed in order to simplify and reduce the existing and time-consuming procedures into a more manageable system. We have proposed processes and procedures for doing this in this report.
- The present MOD committee structure needs to be reviewed and guidelines laid down on the way committees should operate in future. The Principal Personnel and Administration Board and Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee should be abolished. A new Procurement Committee should be established with different terms of reference and membership.

6. The report also highlights the need for MOD to develop a personnel policy to cover its own civilian staff. In this context, there is an initial need to establish the status of the 1,000 plus work service employees, recruited by the Military, but not recognized as part of the main stream Civil Service. It also recommends that those civilian staff, managed through the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, who have been appointed by the Public Service Commission, but have not previously participated in the verification process should now report to the Establishment Secretary's Office for verification action.

7. A full list of our recommendations is overleaf.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. The Constitution of Sierra Leone should be amended to reflect the revised organizational arrangements emerging as a result of the MOD restructuring exercise and the creation of a single Joint Force Command (Para 8.4);
2. Existing primary legislation in the defence sector - The Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces Act 1961 (as amended) - should be reviewed, updated and consolidated (Para 8.5);
3. The grouping of MOD functions set out in Option 1 should be adopted (Para 8.15);
4. The revised directorate structure proposed should be introduced (Para 8.18);
5. The Establishment's Secretary's Office should be asked to approve the new organizational structure and to undertake an evaluation of the senior civilian posts in order to determine the appropriate grading for the positions in question (Para 8.23);
6. The Coordinator of the Public Sector Reform Unit should draw the attention of the consultants undertaking the Pay and Grading Reform Review to the pay anomalies and grading existing at the MOD (Para 8.24);
7. The concerns expressed by MOD staff to the Review Team about the frequent change of Permanent Secretary at the Ministry should be brought to the attention of the Civil Service Postings Committee (Para 8.26);
8. The Ministry should prepare an annual management plan setting out details of its key objectives, resource inputs, priorities, timescales and assigned responsibilities (Para 8.28);
9. Work plans should be prepared by each directorate (Para 8.29);
10. All professional, administrative and clerical staff should be provided with written job descriptions (Para 8.30);
11. The existing draft Scheme of Service should be reviewed, updated and resubmitted to the Establishment Secretary's Office for consideration and approval (Para 8.31);
12. Procedures should be developed to monitor and manage activity and programme performance against budgets (Para 8.33);

13. Programme managers should be provided with regular management reports comparing budget allocation against expenditure (Para 8.34);
14. The Director of Audit should prepare an annual plan setting out a proposed work programme and priorities for the approval of the Deputy Minister (Para 8.36);
15. A report should be issued in respect of every system audited giving a professional opinion on its adequacy and operation together with any relevant recommendations for action to be taken (Para 8.37);
16. Priority should be given to providing further professional training for audit staff (Para 8.38);
17. The Office of the Auditor General should undertake an audit of the MOD during 2004 (Para 8.39);
18. In the interests of transparency and improved control, all procurement activities at MOD should be centralized in the Directorate of Procurement (Para 8.41);
19. The Ministry should investigate the possibility of arranging "Call Off" contracts in appropriate circumstances so as to provide greater flexibility and speed of response in meeting their procurement requirements (Para 8.42);
20. The existing informal working group, known as the Procurement Working Group, should be replaced by a more formal body known as the Procurement Committee (Para 8.43);
21. A tracking system should be introduced to assist staff involved in the procurement process in monitoring procurement action and in identifying the reasons for any delay in processing orders (Para 8.44);
22. Any review of existing MOD committee structures and arrangements should also examine current practices and procedures with the aim of laying down clear guidelines in terms of the way they should operate in future (Para 8.47);
23. The Principal Personnel and Administration Board and Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee should be abolished. (Para 8.48);
24. The Defence Estates Committee should be managed at directorate level in future rather than attracting the status of a Higher Management Defence Committee (Para 8.49)

25. Any review of the Higher Management Defence Committee structure should examine the case for DPOC subsuming the present role and committee responsibilities of the Defence Management Board (Para 8.50);
26. The Ministry should set up a working group to review and determine the position and status of those civilian staff, mainly work service employees, who work for the RSLAF but are not regarded as main stream civil servants (Para 8.51);
27. The Ministry, in conjunction with the Establishment Secretary's Office should develop a policy to cover MOD civilian staff (Para 8.53);
28. An appraisal reporting system should be introduced at the earliest opportunity (Para 8.55);
29. The Assistant Secretary post in the Directorate of Staff and Administration should be assigned specific responsibility for civilian personnel matters at MOD (Para 8.56);
30. The Permanent Secretary, in conjunction with the Chief of Defence Staff, should agree and lay down administrative standards of procedures to be observed by MOD staff (Para 8.57);
31. The Ministry should be included in any Records Management work programme initiated by the Public Service Reform Unit (Para 8.59);
32. Clerks in the Central Registry should undertake a file census at fortnightly intervals to minimize the risk of files being mislaid (Para 8.59);
33. The Ministry should consult the Establishment Secretary's Office about the possibility of paying a special allowance to those clerks acting in a secretarial capacity in line with the practice operating in other ministries (Para 8.61);
34. The Military Attache posts in the offices of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff should be upgraded to the rank of Lt Colonel (Para 8.62);
35. A study should be commissioned into MOD information technology requirements with the aim of developing an IT Strategy for the Ministry (Para 8. 66);
36. Secure communication facilities should be provided at Tower Hill so that an adequate monitoring capability of all communications in the RSLAF is available to the senior command personnel based at MOD (Para 8.68);

37. No security vetting programme for staff is in place at MOD and the GOSL's attention should be drawn to this omission (Para 8.69)
38. The Ministry, in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance and the Establishment Secretary's Office, should ensure that the authorized manpower figures approved and published in the 2004 budget estimates reflect the actual allocation agreed by post, job designation and grade (Para 8.70);
39. Those civilian staff, managed through the Armed Forces Personnel Centre and holding permanent and pensionable posts in the Civil Service, should report to the Establishment Secretary's Office for verification action (Para 8.71);
40. The Ministry should undertake a monthly reconciliation exercise between the number of staff recorded on the approved staff list and the payroll (Para 8.72);
41. The Ministry should be encouraged to introduce quantitative techniques and methods of accurately assessing workloads, such as job inspection, as part of its manpower planning and control processes (Para 8.73);
42. A physical count should be carried out in December 2003 of all civilian staff working for MOD/RSLAF (Para 8.74);
43. The number of cleaners and gardeners at Tower Hill should be reduced from 29 and 8 to 15 and 6 respectively and the Ministry should discuss with the Establishment Secretary's Office the feasibility of consolidating these posts into the MOD permanent establishment (Para 8.75);
44. Management control of clerical and ancillary staff at MOD should be exercised by the Staff Superintendent in line with the practice operating at other Ministries (Para 8.76);
45. The Ministry should develop and introduce a training policy to cover MOD civilian staff and once this is done a training needs assessment should be undertaken, if necessary with outside assistance, to clarify the training needs of MOD civilian staff (Para 8.79);
46. An inventory should be undertaken of existing equipment available to cleaning and gardening staff to identify any shortfall in requirements and, if the necessary funding is available, to purchase any materials and equipment needed (Para 8.81);

- 47 As funding becomes available, MOD should purchase two motorcycles for the use of staff at Tower Hill to enable them to carry out their duties more efficiently (Para 8.82);
- 48 Links between the Military and Civil Society organizations should be re-activated in order to improve mutual understanding and develop confidence building with the civilian population (Para 8.84).

# REVIEW OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

## 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Following an Output to Purpose Review (OPR) of the UK sponsored Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP II) undertaken in July 2002, the Review Team identified that many of the systems and processes developed during the early days of SILSEP for the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence (MOD) were not fully understood or accepted by the organization's staff. This view was reinforced during the course of a SILSEP III planning mission in February 2003 when it was clear that staff remained dissatisfied with the perceived lack of clarity and the potential for overlap and duplication in their assigned roles and responsibilities. It was therefore agreed with senior management locally and the UK Commander IMATT that this would be an appropriate time to review the organization, structure and processes of the Ministry. As part of the Department for International Development (DFID) continuing programme of support for the Government of Sierra Leone's (GOSL) commitment to promote good governance in the public service, the former agreed to commission a study into this work.

1.2 This report covers a review carried out by a joint team of Sierra Leonean and UK consultants during October/November 2003 into the organization, structures and processes at the MOD. The OPR also highlighted a number of other weaknesses in the present way the Ministry operates and the report also addresses some of these specific issues by reviewing the existing functions and systems in place, and by examining and commenting on manpower matters as well as the administrative and working arrangements of the organization.

## 2. TERMS OF REFERENCE

2.1 The initial detailed terms of reference provided for this assignment are set out in Appendix A.

2.2 The objective of the consultancy was to conduct a functional, organizational and management review of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). This primarily involved:

- Completing an analysis of MOD functions in terms of clarity of objectives, coherence, priorities, roles and relationships both internal, particularly with Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Joint Force Command (JFC) and Joint Support Command (JSC) and operational commands and externally with Other Government Departments (OGDs) and UNAMSIL.

- Completing an analysis of ministry organization and structure and constituent departments and assess its suitability for delivering functions with optimum efficiency and effectiveness.
- Reviewing key administrative procedures, communication and coordination mechanisms, work flows, approval processes for optimum efficiency and effectiveness.

### 2.3 Making recommendations on:

- The redefinition of functions designed to enhance clarity, coherence and ensure efficient and effective performance;
- Revised job specifications and job descriptions for key professional posts;
- Improvements to the organizational structure consistent with the revised functions;
- Improvements to key systems and processes to enhance efficient and effective delivery of key MOD outputs.

2.4 In essence, the review was focused on the functions, structures and administrative arrangements of the Ministry and the staff directly employed in support of these activities. It did not include reviewing the staffing levels or work of the Armed Forces.

2.5 Before starting the study, we discussed the terms of reference with senior management and the UK Civil and Military Advisers at the Ministry. Prior to our arrival, the Ministry had established a Task Force to review the future command structure requirements of the organization and this group's recommendation to re-design the command structure at MOD was approved shortly after our arrival by the Defence Policy and Operations Committee (DPOC), which is chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence. To avoid delay and duplication of activities, the DFID Review Team readily acknowledged the detailed work and decisions already undertaken and adjusted its planned work programme to take account of the revised circumstances.

## **3.0 OUR APPROACH TO THE STUDY**

3.1 We met the Permanent Secretary and a number of his civilian colleagues in September 2003 prior to the start of the review to discuss the arrangements for undertaking the study and the methodology to be used during the fieldwork stage of the study. It was agreed that the main source of data collection would be

questionnaires and interviews and for this purpose a form had been designed (see Appendix B) for completion initially by senior staff at the Ministry. In practice, this included the Deputy Secretaries responsible for Policy and Procurement and Finance and Administration, the Assistant Chiefs of Defence Staff covering Operations and Plans and Support and Logistics as well as senior positions in Joint Force and Joint Supply Commands. We also included for interview the head of each directorate as well as other subordinate posts in the organization where it was necessary to obtain a clearer picture of the activities and working arrangements of the Ministry or its related commands.

3.2 The questionnaires were used as the basis for these structured interviews and the information obtained enabled us to build up a picture of the functions, structures and working arrangements of the Ministry. The interviews also covered manpower and management issues, working practices, internal and external links with the Ministry as well as any other problems or other issues identified. Approximately 70 staff at the Ministry were interviewed during the fieldwork stage of the work programme and the names of the people seen are listed at Appendix C.

3.3 Interviews were also conducted with officials from the Establishment Secretary's Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Auditor General's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Office of National Security as well as representatives of Civil Society. The names of those concerned are also listed in Appendix C.

3.4 In addition to the interviews and meetings, we collected information on workloads, numbers of staff and vacancies when this data was available as well as relevant reports and documents that could assist with the review. Details of the documents seen are recorded at Appendix D.

3.5 The fieldwork stage of the study was completed between 7 October and 17 November 2003.

## **4.0 RESPONSIBILITY**

4.1 Although this report has been commissioned by DFID under British Aid arrangements, the British Government bears no responsibility and is not in any way committed to the views and recommendations expressed herein.

## **5.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

5.1 We wish to express our appreciation for the support and assistance provided during the study by the Permanent Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Staff and their colleagues at the Ministry. In this context, we pay particular tribute

to Mr Augustine Sheku, Deputy Secretary Policy and Procurement, for the efficient way he coordinated arrangements during our visit and his unfailing courtesy and patience in dealing with our enquiries or arranging for them to be answered.

5.2 We were also grateful for the help provided by Aldo Gaeta and Colonel Andrew Johnstone, UK Civil and Military Advisers respectively to the Ministry, in particular for sharing with us their invaluable insights into the workings of the organization.

5.3 We would also wish to express our thanks for the interest and support in the study provided by Ian Stuart and his staff at the DFID Development Office in Freetown.

## **6. BACKGROUND**

### **Historical Perspective**

6.1 Prior to independence, the military was known as the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces and this name was subsequently changed to the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) when the country declared itself a republic in 1971. It was a single service organization until 1979 when the Sierra Leone Navy was established. In 1995, Military Defence Headquarters (DHQ) was set up, the Sierra Leone Air Wing was formed and the revised structure consisting of the Army, Navy and Air Wing operated along single service lines under the overall command of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The RSLMF was renamed the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (AFRSL) to reflect the new arrangements in place.

6.2 Policy, planning and controlling resources during this period was ostensibly the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, composed solely of a small number of civil servants. In practice, however, they exercised little influence on the direction of the military as the latter frequently by-passed the Ministry and dealt directly with the President.

6.3 Many reasons have been given for the subsequent collapse of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces during the tragic events of the civil war during the 1990s. The signing of the Lome Peace agreement in July 1999 and the decision by the United Nations to establish a peacekeeping force to work alongside ECOMOG heralded a new era for Sierra Leone. Following the end of the conflict, however, it was evident that there was a need to re-structure and strengthen the MOD and, at the same time, to develop a professional army committed to democratic principles and civilian control exercised on behalf of the elected government. In January 2002, the present Ministry of Defence was established and the transformation of the AFRSL to the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) took place. The present Ministry was established as a joint civilian/military institution and the DHQ reorganized to form the HQ Joint Force (JFC) and Joint Support Commands (JSC). This reform was made possible through a bilateral agreement between the Governments of Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom to train the RSLAF and reorganize the MOD.

6.4 As a result of this agreement, an International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) was set up by the British in 2001 and given the responsibility of undertaking the training and restructuring programmes required. Because of the parlous state of the RSLAF at the time, IMATT personnel initially filled many of the operational positions in the new structures established but, as time passes, Sierra Leone officers are being trained, absorbed and integrated into the new organizations to take over these posts. This process has been accelerated by the present Commander IMATT to ensure that the RSLAF are prepared for the changes in priorities that will occur as a result of the UNAMSIL

draw-down in 2004 and that the Sierra Leoneans are increasingly in a position to take over greater responsibility for their own defence.

6.5 Meanwhile, in parallel with the restructuring process being undertaken by IMATT to develop the military capacity of the RSLAF to meet the challenges ahead, work has also been initiated by the MOD to ensure that the Ministry is in a position to provide effective direction and support to the Armed Forces within existing available resources. In this context, the Ministry has been reviewing its future organizational requirements and aims in order to complete the process and implement the agreed revised structures during 2004.

## **7.0 OVERVIEW OF PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS**

### **Legislation**

7.1 The MOD operates under section 61 of Cap 5 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991. The Head of the Ministry and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is HE the President who is assisted by a Deputy Defence Minister. Current legislation governing the country's Armed Forces dates back to the Royal Sierra Leone Forces Act 1961 as amended by Act 29/1972 and Decree 9/1995.

7.2 The Ministry is the government department primarily responsible, together with the Sierra Leone Armed Forces and other security agencies, for the defence of the people of Sierra Leone and the national interest. This is in line with the commitment given in Section 5 2(b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 that " the security, peace and welfare of the people of Sierra Leone shall be the primary purpose and responsibility of Government and to this end it shall be the duty of the Armed Forces, the Police, Public Officers and all security agents to protect and safeguard the people of Sierra Leone." The Ministry plays a pivotal role in meeting its responsibilities in this context and for ensuring that the operational policies and plans, the support and logistics are in place to enable the Armed Forces to discharge their responsibility for securing Sierra Leone's borders, land area and territorial waters.

### **Strategic Objectives**

7.3 The overall goal of the Ministry incorporated in its Mission Statement is:

" To formulate, implement, monitor and evaluate strategic defence policy for the new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces that is effective and fostered within the framework of democratic government".

7.4 Primary objectives include:

- To develop and maintain a re-structured and robust RSLAF that is well trained, well disciplined and well cared for.

- To equip and provide logistic support to the RSLAF.
- To transform the RSLAF into an organization that is accountable, incorruptible and subject to democratic control.
- To continually evolve and improve the RSLAF.

7.5 In addition, MOD is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the RSLAF is in a position to meet a range of Military Tasks and Defence Missions. These include:

- To provide the forces needed in peacetime, crisis or conflict to demonstrate and maintain the security and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone.
- To afford military aid to the civil authorities in Sierra Leone in peace time, crisis or emergencies.
- To contribute to the promotion and defence of wider national interests, to humanitarian and disaster relief operations and to regional stability, including assistance to international organizations such as UN, AU and ECOWAS.

### **Role of MOD**

7.6 The role of MOD is to advise the Ministers of Defence and to exercise strategic direction on their behalf over the armed forces. In addition to the support provided to Ministers, staff are involved in determining defence policy overall and developing a planning process to produce effective programmes within the resources available. This mix of military and civilian staff operating together with common goals epitomizes the new working relationship in the defence sector in Sierra Leone.

7.7 The Ministry's offices at Tower Hill, Freetown contain the Office of the Deputy Minister and those of the Permanent Secretary and Chief of the Defence Staff together with their administrative and military support staff. According to information provided by the Ministry, there were 191 staff in post at the MOD at the time of the study. A breakdown of this figure indicated that there were 94 civilian staff and 97 uniformed personnel. The Ministry's budget for 2003 covering personnel expenditure and other charges is Le 68.4 billion and the projected figures for 2004 and 2005 are Le 73.9 billion and Le 80 billion respectively.

7.8 The Ministry works closely with other government agencies in the security sector in Sierra Leone and is represented on the Defence Council, which is the supreme defence body, and the National Security Council.

**7.9 Policy Responsibilities:** The Government has recently issued a Defence White Paper that outlines a broad policy framework for defence in Sierra Leone. In effect, it is a consultative document that seeks to inform the people of Sierra Leone of developments in the defence sector and the measures that have already been taken to ensure the Armed Forces are equipped to meet the challenges the country faces. As part of the consultative process, the people are being encouraged to participate in the defence debate by making known their views on the issues involved.

7.10 The publication of the Defence White Paper is an initial step towards undertaking a more detailed review of the nation's defence requirements that will be led by the findings of the holistic security sector review being undertaken by the GOSL.

7.11 At operational levels within the Ministry, individual directorates have developed approved policies within prescribed programmes but there is no effective MOD mechanism in place – at least in terms of a coherent delivery plan - to monitor or coordinate all these programmes.

### **Functions/Structures**

7.12 Prior to the start of the study, the Ministry provided the DFID Review Team with a copy of its organogram and this is reproduced at Appendix E. The Ministry is currently organized on a directorate basis with a civilian Permanent Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) occupying the two most senior positions in the organization but neither being subordinate to the other. The Permanent Secretary is the Government's principal civilian adviser on defence and is the Vote Controller for the Department. He is primarily responsible for policy, finance, procurement and administration in the Ministry and is accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of all public money voted for defence purposes. The CDS is the professional head of the armed forces and the principal military adviser to Defence Ministers and the Government.

7.13 The present MOD structure, which is functionally based, provides for four commands below the level of Permanent Secretary and CDS. Deputy Secretaries fill two of these posts while the other two are occupied by Assistant Chiefs of Defence Staff. Each command contains a number of directorates, headed by a director, each responsible for a specific policy subject and/or a range of support activities. Within this structure, uniformed and civilian personnel work side by side either in civilian-led directorates or vice versa. Several of these directorates are manned by only one or two staff and the viability of these structures in their existing form must be questionable.

7.14 Under present arrangements, the current structures have created grading and pay anomalies with uniformed personnel reporting to civilian postholders junior to them in government grading terms and civilians occupying posts at the

same operational level as military officers but attracting substantially lower grading and remuneration packages.

7.15 The current structures and processes employed within the MOD were designed and installed during the 1999 inception phase of the UK sponsored Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme. Because of operational considerations there was very little opportunity for effective consultation, review and validation of the new structures or processes at the time they were introduced. Earlier this year, senior management in the Ministry recognized that the present structures were not functioning effectively and needed to be reviewed. As indicated earlier in the report, the Ministry, under the auspices of the Defence Policy and Operations Committee (DPOC), established a Task Force ie the Command Structure Review Team, to examine the present command structure of the organization and to recommend any changes that could usefully be made to improve the existing arrangements. The exercise involved examining the activities and relationships of MOD and Joint Force and Joint Support Commands. The Review Team identified a number of issues relating specifically to functional and structural problems impacting on the organization that needed to be addressed. These involved potential duplication and overlap of activities, lack of clarity of functions and objectives, confused reporting lines of command and inadequate internal systems and processes to meet MOD operational requirements.

7.16 Other significant issues and areas of activity identified requiring action included:

- Lack of strategic operational planning capacity in MOD.
- Inadequate financial management information available to allow programme managers to do their jobs effectively.
- A need to review the MOD Committee structure.

7.17 As a result of this exercise and the analysis undertaken, the Review Team designed a high level structure down to one star general level with the aim of strengthening the command structure at MOD and clarifying reporting links in the chain of command. The revised arrangements involved the creation of a single Joint Force Command and transferring some of the functions and related work currently undertaken by JSC to the Ministry and by re-allocating a number of functions between directorates where there were compelling operational reasons for doing so. The Review Team presented their proposals to DPOC in October and approval was given to proceed. The revised command structure approved is shown at Appendix F.

7.18 In terms of functions, it was agreed that the DFID Review Team would consolidate the work already undertaken by the MOD Review Team by

analyzing, validating and mapping the individual functions and related activities identified for inclusion in the new organizational structure.

7.19 In this context, the key functions of MOD can be summarized as follows:

- The development and implementation of a defence policy in line with the country's strategic objectives and requirements and ensuring the Ministry discharges its international obligations.
- Provision of advice and direction on operational and logistic support matters including planning at the strategic and operational level of either the actual or potential commitment of Sierra Leone forces to crises, operations and exercises.
- Development, implementation and management of an effective logistic and equipment support policy and programmes.
- The management and development of the Defence Estate and provision of military accommodation and facilities.
- The provision of an appropriate level of medical care for the Armed Forces and liaising with national and international agencies on health matters.
- The allocation and management of public financial and material resources in the defence sector.

7.20 In addition to these key functions, the Ministry is also responsible for carrying out the support functions of personnel management, accounting and financial management, administration and public relations.

### **Working Arrangements**

7.21 Direct supervision of staff and work activities is carried out by line managers on a daily basis or by regular reporting arrangements. All directorates visited had prepared work programmes covering their organization's activities as part of the annual budget process although these documents generally lacked sufficient detail in terms of tasks, outputs and timescales for day to day working purposes. In most cases, there were no formal work plans available and this was particularly evident in the policy and planning directorates of the Policy and Procurement Command where objectives, functions and roles needed to be clarified and developed. In contrast, the Public Relations and Information directorate of the same Command had clear objectives and, despite resource constraints, gave the impression of functioning well.

7.22 In the military directorates reviewed, objectives were more clearly defined and the failure to undertake specific activities was largely due to a lack of technical expertise or human and material resources. The current problems relating to confused reporting lines between MOD, JFC and JSC should be largely addressed by the revised command structure proposed.

7.23 In terms of financial and budgetary management, the Ministry operates a centralized system of control with decision making exercised by the Permanent Secretary as Vote Controller. There are no budget lines for individual directorates and proposals have therefore to be submitted to the Permanent Secretary for decision in all cases. We were also informed that that it has become the rule for the Deputy Minister to be consulted before any expenditure is authorized.

7.24 Most clerical and administrative staff interviewed had not been issued with job descriptions although standard job schedules were available in some cases. We were informed that the lack of job descriptions resulted in some confusion over line management responsibilities on occasions.

## **Staffing**

7.25 According to information provided by the Ministry, there were 94 civilian staff and 97 uniformed personnel employed at MOD at the time of the review. The latter consisted of 23 officers and 74 other ranks while the civilian component was broken down into the following category of posts:

Senior Administrators	18
Clerical staff	28
Cleaners	29
Gardeners	8
Other Support Staff	11
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	94

7.26 In addition to the 191 posts referred to in paragraph 7.25, reception and security duties at the MOD were provided by a further 10 police officers and 20 soldiers on a round the clock basis daily.

7.27 Control of these posts was fragmented with the Staff Superintendent at MOD responsible for overseeing the activities of the clerical staff and some ancillary posts. She had however no supervisory responsibility for monitoring the work of the cleaners and gardeners on site as this task was undertaken by the Facilities Manager/RQMS.

7.28 Examination of the 2003 budget estimates indicated that the total authorized manpower provision for civilian staff under the Office of the Director General is 1448 posts. Most of these posts were deployed at military

establishments in direct support of the Armed Forces. The majority of these positions are held by work service employees, but the figure also includes 65 nursing and 130 clerical posts. It was almost impossible to reconcile the manpower figures in the expenditure estimates with the staff in post. A comparison between the numbers recorded on various civilian staff lists provided and the payroll data for September 2003 indicated that there were 1409 civilian staff in post but 1434 people on the payroll for the period in question.

7.29 There is no central point at MOD that could provide information about the number of existing civilian vacancies in the organization and we return to this subject later in the report.

## **Training**

7.30 The Directorate of Staff and Administration has yet to prepare a training policy to cover the needs of administrative and clerical staff. In general, therefore, training opportunities to enhance management, administrative and professional skills have been limited. This was especially evident in support services where very few of the clerical staff interviewed had received any training in administration and office related skills other than basic computer training..

## **Accommodation & Material Resources**

7.31 Accommodation standards at MOD are reasonably good compared to those applying at some of the other four Ministries that have been subject to date to administrative reviews. The building, formerly a hotel, was only opened in 2002 – and although a question mark could justifiably be placed about the quality of workmanship involved in the refurbishment programme – the main problem is that the layout of the building does not provide for easy and effective communication or staff control.

7.32 All directorates have been issued with a computer although these are essentially stand-alone machines and there are no local area network facilities in place. A lack of access to official transport was also one of the main complaints raised with the Review Team. MOD has only the one utility vehicle available for staff and this lack of mobility is having an adverse impact on performance. Staff in Central Support Services, such as cleaners and gardeners, also lack sufficient tools and equipment to meet their requirements.

## **8.0 ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

8.1 In this section of the report, we review in detail the functions and structures that underpin the organization and comment on other issues that emerged during the study. As part of this process, we have conducted approximately seventy individual interviews with staff at MOD, JFC and JSC as well as meeting members of the Command Structure Working Group on several occasions in order to obtain their views on the work of the Ministry and to gain feedback on some of our ideas for change. We have also consulted with other Ministries and agencies with close working links to MOD as well as speaking to representatives of Civil Society organizations that have an interest in the work of the Ministry and Armed Forces.

8.2 In one of the many documents made available to us during this study, the Ministry indicated that its vision was “to become a model of excellence for public sector reform”. Much work has been undertaken at the MOD in the past three years in creating the institutional and working environment in which military and civilians work together within a framework of democratic government. Although there is still much to be done to develop and optimize working arrangements – the present relationships could by no means be described as seamless - it is only right to acknowledge the significant achievements already delivered in a relatively short space of time. In this context, the restructuring and internal scrutiny processes currently being developed are designed to ensure the MOD is equipped to meet the challenges that lie ahead in providing necessary direction and support to the RSLAF although it was very evident during this review that at present MOD still relies heavily on the expertise and support provided by IMATT personnel. The acid test will come when this support is no longer available in its present form and IMATT officers operate in an advisory rather than in line management roles. The planned reduction of the RSLAF from its present establishment of around 14,000 to 10,000 by 2007 will also test the robustness and resilience of the systems and changes being introduced.

8.3 It is also important, in our view, to draw attention in a report of this nature to the wide disparities that currently exist, particularly in terms of grading and remuneration, between civilian and military staff. (In some instances, military staff are paid over 400% more than their civilian colleagues occupying posts at the same level). We believe that unless the Ministry and the relevant authorities address this issue in the near future, it will have a significantly negative impact in creating a fair, fully integrated, cohesive and effective organization. We discuss the issues involved further in paragraphs 8.21 et seq. .

### **Statutory Framework**

8.4 Section 165 (1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 stipulates that the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone should consist of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. If the revised command structure proposed for MOD should be

introduced with the creation of a single Joint Force Command, we are advised that there will be a need to amend the Constitution to reflect the new arrangements in place. In this event, **we recommend** that the Attorney General's Department is approached and asked to prepare the necessary legislation

8.5 **We also recommend** that the existing primary legislation in the defence sector – the Royal Sierra Leone Military Forces Act 1961 (as amended) – which largely reflects the situation relevant in the country over thirty years ago - should be reviewed, consolidated and updated to meet present day requirements.

## **Functions**

8.6 A major task for the DFID Review Team during this study was identifying, validating and recording the various functions and related activities arising from the restructuring and reorganization of MOD. These included the functions that could realistically be moved to MOD from JSC. Due to the detail involved and the fact that the Ministry wanted to use the information during a series of planned workshops for staff during December 2003, this data has been included, for ease of reference, in a separate document to this report.

8.7 When examining and developing their proposals for the revised command structure for MOD, the Command Structure Review Team had recommended the regrouping and elimination of certain functions to avoid duplication of activities and to define more clearly line management responsibilities and arrangements. While fully accepting the thinking and logic behind their proposal to rationalize work activities in five one star commands at MOD, we reviewed the mix and match of functions identified for individual one star commands. Although we agreed with most of the changes proposed, our analysis indicated that a different combination of functions and responsibilities particularly in the Financial and Administration and the Policy and Procurement one star commands planned might provide for a more even and effective balance of activities and working arrangements. With this in mind, we arrived at two options in relation to grouping of functions and these are shown at Appendices G and H.

8.8 **Option 1:** This involves bringing together policy, planning and programming in one command together with the additional functions of monitoring and evaluation. There is a natural linkage and relationship between these activities in the planning and development cycle and the synergy benefits of keeping these functions together should outweigh in operational terms any case for separation. The Public Relations and Information functions have also been retained in this command on the basis that this unit should be seen in the first place as providing essential support to the Minister in projecting and explaining the policies of MOD as well as being the focal point in dealing with all press and media enquiries.

8.9 Under this option, procurement would be located in the Finance and Administration command because of the work related linkage of its functions and activities with finance and budgets. To ensure that the necessary checks and balances are maintained, however, it is proposed that control, oversight and authorization of equipment and procurement items should rest elsewhere (see paragraph 8.43). On balance, the Legal Adviser's Unit has also been retained within the Finance and Administration command because of the potential workload generated on civil law and related matters. We accept, however, that an equally strong case could be made, because of the work arising on military law issues, for placing the unit in one of the military ACDS commands.

8.10 **Option 2:** In the case of this option, the Finance and Budgeting functions would be placed in the same command as Planning, Policy, Programmes and Monitoring and Evaluation while Public Relations and Information would be brigaded with Procurement, Staff and Administration and Legal Affairs. The advantage of this grouping of functions would be that the planning function would be more closely aligned with the budgetary process and being in the same command might be in a position to respond more quickly to changes in planning priorities. In addition, this configuration would retain the procurement process within a single command and possibly avoid a conflict of management responsibility if two commands are involved in the administration of contract activities and authorization of goods. Adoption of this grouping might also provide initially a more evenly balanced workload between the two civilian commands.

8.11 The other changes we have in mind in terms of functions apply in the case of both options. We support the proposal to move the Directorate of Defence Estates from Finance & Administration to the ACDS Support and Logistics as this would offer a more natural home for its activities. We have also identified some functions of Design Cell currently part of J4 Infrastructure Unit that could be transferred to MOD to join the Defence Estate directorate.

8.12 Policy functions and some of the casework relating to defence personnel career management have already been moved from the Armed Forces Personnel Centre to MOD. We concur with this decision as well as supporting plans to move those policy functions relating to training currently undertaken at Cockerill to Tower Hill.

8.13 We also considered the case for bringing together military and civilian personnel and training functions within the same command but eventually decided against this move following discussions with the Establishment Secretary's Office. The advice received was that because of the comparatively small number of MOD civilian staff involved ie those holding permanent and pensionable posts, the wide differences in terms and conditions of service and the fact that their career and posting arrangements were directly the responsibility of the Establishment Secretary's Office, it would be better to keep the functions and responsibilities separate from those of the uniformed

personnel. In the circumstances, we would envisage civilian personnel and training functions remaining part of the Staff and Administration directorate for the time being.

8.14 We have included Reserves as well as Doctrine and Operational Requirements in the list of functions as these activities were formerly shown in the Ministry's organization chart as two separate directorates. Although we understand that these functions and related activities are not currently being undertaken, and are unlikely to be resourced in the immediate future, we have retained them in the list of functions for the time being as provision against potential future requirements.

8.15 Although a persuasive case could be made for selecting either of the two options, **we recommend** that Option 1 should be adopted. In this case, all functions in the Finance and Administration Directorate are support related and deal with the financial issues of MOD, and more significantly the procurement process would be clearly transparent, particularly if the procedural changes proposed are adopted. In addition, the inclusion of policy, planning and evaluation in the same command would provide a more focused and sound foundation for developing the planning process within the organization. We also consider that Public Relations and Information sits more comfortably with Policy and Planning rather than if it was combined with Administration and Procurement. In terms of workload, we accept that it will take time to build up the policy planning capacity of MOD. As staff become more experienced, however, and the full range of functions are undertaken, there is likely to be a substantial increase in workload particularly when the monitoring and evaluation activities are fully developed.

8.16 Our proposals on re-organizing functions should result in improved clarity and coherence in operational terms although we are conscious that in practical terms there are substantial skill and resource constraints that need to be addressed if MOD is to move forward. Some of the existing shortcomings can be met through implementing effective staff training programmes but, in other instances, the only solution may be adoption of a more radical approach, at least as a short-term measure, such as recruiting qualified civilians into the Armed Forces to resolve some of the apparent skill shortages.

### **Structures and Management Arrangements**

8.17 The proposed realignment of functions provides an opportunity, in terms of restructuring the organization below one star general level, to reduce the number of directorates by rationalizing activities in the same unit. For example, there is a strong case in our view for bringing policy and planning activities together in the same directorate for the reasons outlined in paragraph 8.8. We would also include monitoring and evaluation initially in this directorate although we could envisage a time when the workload involved might justify creating a separate

directorates for these activities. The range and scope of activities should provide a viable unit in terms of overall workload for this command with the inclusion of the work of the Directorate of Public Relations and Information. We have not shown Reserves and Doctrine and Operational Requirements as active operational directorates but have indicated where we consider these functions should be located in the structure if they should be re-activated in the future.

8.18 A revised organization structure listing the individual commands and related directorates based on our preferred functional option ie Option 1, is shown at Appendix I. **We recommend** that this structure be adopted by MOD.

8.19 When the existing directorate structure was established at MOD in 2000, we understand that the Establishment Secretary's Office was asked at the time to post suitable civilian candidates to the Ministry to fill senior administrative and management positions including those of deputy secretaries, directors and deputy directors. It was made clear to those concerned at the time that they would retain their existing grades even if the job designations assigned would normally attract a much higher grade in civil service terms. This was particularly relevant in the case of Senior Assistant Secretaries (G8) who occupied director posts which would normally attract G11 status.

8.20 We are advised that it was pointed out at the time to those involved in setting up the structures at the new MOD that there would be a substantial imbalance in terms of grading and job experience between the military and civilian staff posted to the organization but the decision was taken to go ahead. As a result, under current arrangements, the following job titles and civil service grades apply to existing senior staff at the MOD.

<b>Job Title</b>	<b>Grade</b>
Permanent Secretary	11
Chief of Defence Staff	14
<b>Head of Command</b>	
Deputy Secretary	9
Asst Chief of Defence Staff (Brigadier)	13
<b>Directors</b>	
Senior Assistant Secretary	8
Colonel	10
<b>Deputy Director</b>	
Assistant Secretaries	7
Lt Colonel	9

8.21 The difference in grades is further exacerbated by the substantial disparity between pay and emoluments received by uniformed personnel and civilian staff employed at the same grade level. For example, the annual salary and allowances of an ACDS head of a command is over 400 per cent more than that of his civilian counterpart and this difference in remuneration is reflected to a lesser extent at other grade levels. Other anomalies arising because of the current grading structure result in uniformed personnel occupying deputy director posts (G9) reporting to civilian directors (G8) who are junior to them in civil service grading terms. We understand that the present directorate structure is largely based on the UK model and, while the manner of its introduction has undoubtedly contributed to some of the existing difficulties, the general feeling within MOD is that the structure remains appropriate for Sierra Leonean needs and should be retained. We support this view.

8.22 The present disparity in conditions of service is clearly however a source of discontent and the situation will continue to fester unless it is addressed. In our view, it is difficult to envisage a fully integrated structure of civilian and military staff working successfully together in optimum harmony and commitment if the present anomalies remain in place. We are not suggesting that there should be absolute parity in conditions of service between uniformed personnel and civilian staff but that the existing differences should be narrowed in grading terms to reflect more accurately current responsibilities and skill requirements.

8.23 The planned restructuring of MOD and the creation of the proposed new one star general command structure provides an opportunity to re-consider and hopefully resolve some, if not all, of the anomalies identified. With this in mind, **we recommend** in the first instance that the Establishment Secretary's Office should be asked to review and formally approve the new structure. If approval is forthcoming, **we recommend** that an evaluation be undertaken of the senior civilian posts in the structure in order to assess and determine the appropriate grading for the positions in question based on agreed job evaluation criteria. In this context, particular attention should be given to the correct grading of the existing civilian deputy secretary and director posts. Without prejudicing the outcome of any review, our initial assessment of the existing civilian deputy secretary post in particular, in terms of skill requirements, representation and responsibilities indicates that there may be a case for placing these positions on G11 under the present grading arrangements. Any change of grading at this level would also mean the Permanent Secretary post would need to be upgraded to Senior Permanent Secretary status.

8.24 We were informed that the GOSL is in the process of commissioning a study into the design of a comprehensive pay and grading reform strategy for the Civil Service. Although the outcome of this review is likely to apply eventually to MOD, we understand that the consultant's report will not be available until April 2004 and the introduction of any changes in pay reform is unlikely therefore to take place until late 2004 at the earliest. In view of the time constraints involved

in implementing the revised structure at MOD, the Establishment Secretary's Office should be asked to mount the job evaluation exercise as soon as possible and the Civil Service Grading Committee should be consulted and be asked to approve the outcome. **We also recommend** that the Coordinator of the Public Service Reform Unit should draw the situation existing at MOD to the attention of the consultants undertaking the Pay and Grading Reform Review for the GOSL so they can consider its relevance in the context of their own particular study.

8.25 Two other significant factors on management issues were brought to the Review Team's attention during this study. The first concerned the fact that reporting lines on the military side in the past had not always been observed in practice with the Joint Force and Joint Support Commanders bypassing the command structures in place at MOD and dealing directly with the Ministry on administrative matters. The revised command structure provisionally approved should mean reporting relationships have now been more clearly defined with the Field Force Commander reporting through the relevant ACDS at MOD in future.

8.26 The other issue related to the frequent change of Permanent Secretary at MOD in recent years. We were informed that the recurring change of staff in this key post was having an unsettling effect on the smooth functioning of the Ministry as each new postholder tended to introduce his own individual work methods and management style to the organization and this often had a significant impact on continuity of work practices and operational arrangements. We recognize that senior appointments of this nature are provisionally decided by the Civil Service Postings Committee and approved by HE The President, and **we recommend** that the concerns expressed to the DFID Review Team about the rate of turnover of postholders in this key position should be drawn to the Committee's attention.

### **Working Arrangements**

8.27 The analysis of the questionnaires completed by MOD staff at the beginning of the study and the ensuing discussions with individual postholders and senior management about the work of the Ministry highlighted a number of issues in terms of the organization's procedures and work practices that need to be addressed. These include:

- The lack of a corporate management plan for the organization and, at lower operational levels, often the absence of work plans and job descriptions.
- A requirement to improve the organization's financial and budgetary control processes.
- Current procurement procedures.
- The MOD Committee Structure.

8.28 **Management and Work Plans:** The Ministry does not currently have a management plan to oversee the activities of the organization and **we recommend** that such a document is prepared. The plan should include details of key MOD objectives for the next financial year together with information about priorities, resource inputs, outputs envisaged as well as timescales and assigned responsibility for delivery of specific activities. It should provide a sense of direction and purpose for those working within MOD/RSLAF and, as such, it will be essential to put in place an effective review mechanism to monitor and assess progress on implementation and amend targets and priorities if the need arises. In view of the significance of this document in the context of the Ministry's overall business, we take the view that responsibility for oversight of this work should rest with the Deputy Minister and senior management at MOD, possibly undertaken as an assigned responsibility of DPOC. We understand that much of the information required to develop a management plan is already available within the Ministry in the form of individual programme objectives and activities together with the organization's budget proposals.

8.29 Work plans generally are not widely available within the Ministry and there is a need to encourage managers at all levels to produce these documents on a regular basis. They provide a useful means of monitoring the activities of individual work units and ensuring work targets are accomplished on time. With this in mind, **we recommend** that these documents should be prepared at directorate level and should cover a six monthly period on a rolling basis.

8.30 **Job Descriptions:** We were informed that staff had job descriptions or job schedules but often on further examination these were drafted in very broad terms or were not in fact available. Job descriptions should underpin the grading structure in place and should ensure that all posts support the work plans agreed and in this way contribute to the aims and objectives of the organization as well as providing staff with information about individual responsibilities and accountabilities. **We recommend** that senior management ensure that all professional, administrative and clerical staff at MOD be provided with a written job description.

8.31 We understand that a draft Scheme of Service was prepared when MOD was initially set up but the document was never approved by the Establishment Secretary's Office. The advantage of having a clearly worded Scheme of Service for any group of officers is that there can be no doubt as to what they need to do to be appointed or promoted. **We recommend** that the existing draft Scheme of Service is updated and resubmitted to the Establishment Secretary's Office for consideration and approval. This will need to be done in conjunction with the outcome of the grading review recommended in paragraph 8.23.

8.32 **Budget & Financial Processes:** In terms of budgetary management, the current structure is based effectively on three divisions, namely MOD, JFC and JSC with provision for a further division, the Territorial Defence Force, at a later date. As a result of the present reorganization exercise, there will be a need to devise a new budgetary structure to support the revised structures emerging from the review and we understand that the Directorate of Finance & Budgets has already identified this as one of its future tasks. Under present arrangements, certain Defence-wide costs, such as utilities and rents, are managed centrally within the MOD component. The MTEF bid for the period 2004-2006 against projected allocation shows a shortfall of about Le 8 billion next year and, depending on the final allocation agreed with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry is likely to face the prospect of identifying substantial savings in order to balance the books.

8.33 Overall management of the budget is largely centralized with the Vote Controller and within the Finance and Budgets directorate. There is currently no delegation of authority as individual directorates and programme managers do not have a separate budget line although they have, in fact, identified their budgetary requirements during the annual estimates process. In our view, the structures should be reviewed to show proposed expenditure within each directorate similar to the practice adopted in other line ministries eg Ministry of Health & Sanitation. Nor are there any requirement processes in place to scrutinize, review and agree needs or any procedures developed to monitor and manage activity or programme performance against budgets. **We recommend** that these are introduced.

8.34 **We also recommend** that heads of directorates should be provided with regular management reports comparing budget allocation against expenditure so that they are better placed to manage their own work programmes. Directors have established their budgetary needs during the estimates process and the systems in place should be designed to encourage greater involvement in the budgetary process as well as ensuring clearer alignment of accountability with responsibility.

8.35 **Internal Audit:** The Ministry has an Internal Audit Unit of seven staff, headed by a Director who is on secondment from the Office of the Auditor General. The Director currently reports to the Permanent Secretary, the Vote Controller, but we understand that it is proposed in future he should be directly accountable to the Deputy Minister. We strongly support this change in reporting arrangements.

8.36 We were informed that the unit's role is primarily concerned with checking payment vouchers, local purchase orders and Vote Service Ledgers. In addition, staff also monitor the delivery of goods and services on site. We understand that no annual work plan is drawn up of audit assignments although we were told the director prepares an annual report of the unit's activities. In future, **we**

**recommend** that the Director should also prepare an annual plan setting out a proposed work programme and priorities for the approval of the Deputy Minister.

8.37 **We also recommend** that following every audit, the Director of Audit should ensure a report is issued in respect of each system audited giving his professional opinion on its adequacy and operation together with relevant recommendations for action to be taken. In addition, the Unit should initiate follow up action on any audit findings and recommendations made to ensure corrective action has been taken.

8.38 In discussions with senior management about the work of the Unit, it emerged that the levels of expertise, resources and capacity available to MOD on audit activities are very limited. The general consensus was that there is a need to provide further training for staff employed on this work to enhance their professional skills. We understand that some staff attended a Public Finance and Public Sector Audit course at the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM) about two years ago. In the circumstances, **we recommend** that priority should be given to meeting this perceived need when MOD is determining its future training programme.

8.39 We understand that there has not been an external audit undertaken of MOD or the Armed Forces for a number of years. Several reasons were given for this omission including problems of access in the past. We discussed this issue with the Auditor General in terms of the possibility of the staff of her Office undertaking an audit of MOD in the near future. She explained that her organization faced major resource constraints and was also in the process of changing its legal status to become an independent institution ie the Audit Service Board. Nevertheless, she thought it should be possible to mount an audit at MOD sometime during the first half of 2004 and **we recommend** that the Office of the Auditor General should go ahead and make arrangements to conduct an audit on this basis.

8.40 **Procurement Procedures:** The Directorate of Procurement is located in the MOD and is the main purchasing unit for both MOD and JSC. It deals with orders up to a value of Le 25m while those in excess of that amount are referred to the Central Tender Board for decision. We identified several weaknesses in the present arrangements and, in the interests of financial probity and good work practice, propose the following change in procedures.

8.41 **We recommend** that in the interests of transparency and improved control all procurement activities should be centralized in the Directorate of Procurement. The Directorate of Defence Estates, which also deals with procurement, should discontinue its direct involvement in purchasing arrangements. We recognize that the needs of the Directorate of Defence Estates are specialized but rather than continue with the current split responsibilities we consider that Defence Estates interests can be fully protected

by the unit being represented on a new Procurement Committee we propose should be set up.

8.42 We also observed that in terms of bulk purchase there is no general provision available in existing procedures to meet the situation where the Ministry is required to negotiate several contracts per year for one service or supply of an essential item or material. Individual contracts are usually prepared as necessary. **We recommend** that the Ministry should investigate the possibility of arranging “Call off” contracts in these cases in order to provide greater flexibility and speed of response in meeting their requirements.

8.43 Although provision was originally made for the overall management of MOD policy of Defence Procurement to be exercised by the “Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee”, we are informed that this body has rarely met. Instead, we understand its functions have largely been undertaken by a Procurement Working Group that has acted in an advisory capacity. **We recommend** that this informal working group should now be replaced by a more formal arrangement ie a Procurement Committee, on which all interested parties should be represented, on the lines set out in Appendix J. To ensure appropriate administrative checks and balances are maintained, the Deputy Secretary Policy & Planning would chair the proposed Procurement Committee under our revised proposals rather than the Permanent Secretary or the Deputy Secretary Finance, Procurement and Administration.

8.44 Under existing arrangements, the Procurement Unit is not in a position to identify or provide information about the state of procurements made in any given period. This information is particularly useful when dealing with enquiries about the progress of orders. **We recommend** that a tracking system be introduced to assist procurement staff in monitoring procurement actions and identifying the reasons for any delay in processing orders. As part of the process, it will be necessary to register each procurement request by initially allocating it a unique number to be used as the basis of any tracking system.

8.45 Details of the revised procurement system and procedures we have in mind are summarized in Appendix J. The overall aim is to simplify and reduce the existing complex and time-consuming procurement processes into a more manageable system.

8.46 **Committee Structure:** Seven committees were originally set up to deal internally with the Ministry’s affairs in terms of policy development and managing the organization’s business. Details of these are recorded at Appendix K. We were frequently told that there are too many committees and, as a result, the present arrangements were not functioning as effectively as they might. There was frequent overlap in subject content at meetings of different committees with the result that members often found themselves discussing similar issues and going over the same ground repeatedly. We were also

informed that two of the committees, the Principal Personnel and Administration Board (PPAB) and the Equipments Approval and Procurement Committee (EAPC), rarely convened and records indicate that the last occasion either Committee met was over 12 months ago.

8.47 It was apparent during this study that a substantial amount of senior management time at MOD was devoted to committee work and attending meetings. It was also evident that senior management acknowledged the need to rethink and re-introduce a committee structure more responsive and relevant to the current needs of MOD. In addition to reorganization and rationalization, part of this process should also entail examining the way the Ministry runs its meetings. For example, more use could be made of subject papers, prepared and circulated in advance of meetings, to discuss specific items on the agenda and so speed up the decision making process. In addition, minutes of meetings should be finalized and circulated to committee members within days of meetings rather than taking weeks to do so as under current arrangements. **We therefore recommend** that any review of committee arrangements should also examine existing committee practices and procedures and lay down clear guidelines in terms of the way they should operate in future.

8.48 An examination of the present committee structure suggests that there is some scope for rationalization. In the case of the Principal Personnel and Administration Board, we were told that there were insufficient subject items arising for discussion to justify the Board convening regularly as general terms and conditions of service for civil servants were largely the responsibility of the Establishment Secretary's Office. In the circumstances, it is difficult to support the continuing existence of this Board as a Standing Committee and **we recommend** that it should be abolished. We do not consider that this would be inconsistent in terms of what we say later in the report about limitations in existing personnel functions. In our view, much of the additional work identified could be taken forward by a working group or Task Force, under the auspices of the Directorate of Staff and Administration, constituted on the lines of the Working Group currently reviewing the reduction in number of civilian work service employees. **We also recommend** that the Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee should be abolished. As indicated in paragraph 8.43, we are proposing the creation of a new Procurement Committee, to replace the present informal arrangements, which would operate in line with the membership proposals and procedures set out in Appendix J and convene as often as circumstances warrant it.

8.49 We also question the need to retain the Defence Estates Committee as a Higher Management Standing Committee of Defence in its own right, particularly if responsibility for procurement should rest in future with the proposed Procurement Committee. We therefore consider that its work could more sensibly be managed at director level and **we recommend** that this arrangement should be adopted.

8.50 In terms of any reorganization of senior Standing Committees, the DPOC, chaired by the Deputy Minister, should be acknowledged in any new structure as the senior committee in MOD. It should have responsibility for all MOD operations and management decisions at a strategic level and be responsible, for example, for approving any management plan, including financial inputs, as well as for monitoring relevant outputs. It should also provide appropriate management direction to the rest of the Ministry. We also consider that there is a case for expanding its role to subsume the current responsibilities of the Defence Management Board but to do this there would need to be a fundamental rethink of the internal consultative and decision-making processes within MOD perhaps by encouraging closer team working and greater line management involvement within individual commands in the overall process. We were told that there is currently considerable overlap between the two committees in terms of membership, agenda items and the content of discussion. While it would be important to ensure that DPOC, in view of its strategic role and responsibilities, was not bogged down in the minutiae of detail or casework we consider that this integration could be achieved and could be a positive move towards speeding up the decision making process within MOD. With this in mind, **we recommend** that any reorganization of the MOD committee structure should examine the possibility of DPOC subsuming the present role and committee responsibilities of the Defence Management Board. In this event, DPOC's terms of reference would need to be modified and membership reviewed to take account of the proposed new arrangements.

### **Working Arrangements – Personnel Policies and Practices.**

8.51 The terms of conditions and service for military and civilian staff at MOD are quite different. The Directorate of Defence Personnel is responsible for policy for uniformed personnel while the Directorate of Staff and Administration handles policy for MOD civilian staff. Well-defined human resource policies are in place covering uniformed personnel at MOD/RSLAF and an active programme for developing and implementing these policies is in progress. This not the case for many of the civilian staff working at MOD/RSLAF who are largely excluded from the standard conditions and terms of service applied to civil servants. For example, the status of many civilian staff working at MOD/RSLAF in terms of employment and "ownership" is unclear and there is an urgent need to clarify and regularize their position at the earliest opportunity. Although General Orders (GO) cover all civil servants appointed through the Public Service Commission and the Establishment Secretary's Office, this represents only about 150 of the 1400 civilian staff working at MOD/RSLAF. The rest of the staff, many of who are employed as tradesmen but largely classified as work service employees, were recruited by the Armed Forces in the past and are not recognized as part of the main stream Civil Service. **We recommend** that the Ministry should set up a working group to review the status of these staff and find an appropriate solution to the problem so that those occupying essential posts are confirmed and

consolidated into the permanent workforce. Representatives of the Establishment Secretary's Office and the Ministry of Finance should also be invited to participate in the review as members of the working group.

8.52 The future management responsibility for these staff also needs to be clarified and agreed but this cannot be finalized until their future employment status is determined and that will depend on the outcome of any policy decision. At present, about 120 civilian staff occupying permanent and pensionable positions and over 1000 work service employees working with the RSLAF are managed by a Senior Accountant in the Armed Forces Personnel Centre at Cockerill Barracks. Clerical and ancillary civilian staff working for MOD at Tower Hill are supervised by managers at the Ministry.

8.53 **We recommend** that the Ministry, in consultation with the Establishment Secretary's Office, should develop an agreed personnel policy not only to cover the future status of these civilian staff but also the wider needs of non-uniformed employees of MOD. In the case of the former category of worker, the policy should cover their terms of employment and job classification as well as ensuring that line management responsibilities and control are clearly defined. In our view it would be sensible if both MOD directorates responsible for personnel issues were involved in these discussions. Any policy introduced should also cover the practices and procedures to observe in respect of the future recruitment, postings, transfers, sickness and retirement of these staff.

8.54 In the wider context, the policy should also spell out any special conditions of service and work practices applying specifically to all civil servants employed at the MOD. This information should be disseminated to directors and all unit heads in the organization with guidance about their responsibilities on these issues.

8.55 **We also recommend** that an appraisal reporting system should be introduced at the earliest opportunity. One of the issues raised with us by a number of the civilian staff were their concerns at the closed nature of the existing confidential reporting arrangements. We were informed by the Establishment Secretary's Office that a revised staff appraisal reporting system has already been developed. It was hoped to introduce it next year along with the planned publication of the Civil Service Code setting out rules and regulations and an Administrative Manual covering office procedures and good practices.

8.56 There is a need to strengthen the personnel skills and human resource capacity of the Staff and Administration Directorate at the Ministry. The long term success of any organization is predicated on its human resources and much work needs to be undertaken at MOD to ensure that the HR function plays a critical role in fostering a positive work environment and employee commitment. As an interim measure, **we recommend** that the Assistant Secretary post should be assigned specific responsibility for civilian personnel matters at MOD and this

function should be included in the relevant job description. In particular, the postholder should be assigned, under the oversight of the Director of Staff and Administration, the job of developing an HR policy relevant to the needs of the MOD. Appropriate training will need to be provided and we understand that this is available at IPAM. Ultimately, it may be necessary to appoint a full-time trained personnel officer to manage the HR function at MOD. Present numbers would not justify this but the situation may change depending on the outcome of the policy review recommended in paragraph 8.53 and the final number of civilian staff deemed to be directly employed by MOD.

### **Working Arrangements: Administrative Procedures**

8.57 No structure, system or administrative procedure will work effectively unless there is seen to be a firm commitment from those who manage the organization concerned and that the arrangements in place are understood and applied by those expected to operate and work within them. For example, we were told about the extended delays that often occurred in staff taking action on files and correspondence and we could not help but notice the amount of time it took to produce the official minutes of meetings we attended. In our view, these administrative limitations are essentially a matter for action by senior management at MOD. **We recommend** that the Permanent Secretary, in consultation with the Chief of Defence Staff, should agree and lay down administrative standards of procedures to be followed at MOD. These should include guidance on target times for dealing with correspondence, taking action on files or casework, the preparation and circulation of minutes of meetings, providing briefing material etc.

8.58 **Records Management:** Although there is a Central Registry at MOD it was evident from our discussions with staff in the building that, because of shortcomings in the service provided, other units have now lost confidence in the facilities available. As a result, individual directorates have set up their own file systems and if the situation is left unchecked, the MOD records management base will become fragmented. We also understand that files go missing from time to time and we were also told that there was a need to review the file codes being used as some doubts had been expressed by staff at the Central Registry about their suitability for the records system currently in operation.

8.59 We understand that Records Management will feature as a component in the next phase of the Public Service Reform Unit's work programme and **we therefore recommend** that MOD should be included in any schedule of work agreed. Meanwhile, **we recommend** that registry clerks undertake a file census at fortnightly intervals to minimize the risk of files being lost or mislaid.

## Secretaries/Clerks

8.60 Clerks are employed in a variety of jobs at MOD, namely in the Accounts and Internal Audit Units, as support staff in the Staff and Administration Directorate and, because of a dire shortage of qualified secretaries in government service, as Secretaries. Most clerks have received some form of computer training and those working in Accounts and Audit received some training at IPAM in basic finance and accounting work but there is still a pressing need to upgrade the standard of their clerical, technical and office skills.

8.61 We had the opportunity of meeting over twenty of the clerks as a group. A number of them have held their present position and grade for many years – in one case as a temporary clerk for more than twenty five years – and the overall impression we gained from our discussion is not only that morale is low but there is a general feeling that, as a cadre, they lack management support. We consider more could be done by the Ministry for these postholders in terms of career development and improving morale. For example, in the case of those clerks acting in a secretarial capacity on approved posts, **we recommend** that the Ministry should consult the Establishment Secretary's Office to obtain authority to pay a special allowance to these staff in line with the practice operating in other ministries.

## Working Arrangements: Other Issues

8.62 **Support to Heads of the Office:** We spoke to the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Permanent Secretary about the level and adequacy of management support they were receiving. In the case of the Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, the current problems arise primarily because of the lack of administrative and management experience and skills of the support staff in post. As a result, work is not being processed or disseminated as quickly as circumstances dictate, follow-up action is often late or overlooked and briefing material is frequently delayed or not provided in appropriate cases. The Deputy Minister's Military Attache (MA) holds the rank of Major while a Captain serves the Chief of Defence Staff. The requirement in both instances would be met if they were provided with Military Attaches, who had at least attended a Senior Staff College management course, and had the requisite administrative experience, management skills and personal qualities to hold down a post of this nature. We understand that a job specification of this kind for the posts in question would normally attract the rank of Lt Colonel. In the circumstances, **we recommend** that the Military Attache (MA) posts in the case of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff be upgraded to the rank of Lt Colonel and suitable candidates identified to fill the positions concerned.

8.63 The position of the Permanent Secretary is different. A clerk who acts as his Secretary assists him and because she is not trained as a Confidential

Secretary there are constraints on the range of duties she can undertake. As a result, work can often accumulate in his absence from the office. The Permanent Secretary has identified the problem and, in discussions with the Review Team, referred to a potential solution that would involve using one of the existing Assistant Secretaries in post, perhaps on a part-time basis, to assist him in a support capacity.

**8.64 Information Technology:** The present situation is that MOD has seventy-one stand-alone computers and limited Internet facilities access that is maintained by a support unit of the CIS directorate. There has not been an integrated approach to the configuration, purchase and distribution of the current equipment.

8.65 We understand that the RSLAF are in the process, with the help of IMATT, of developing and introducing their own IT solutions to meet their particular needs. In our view, there is an equally strong case for examining the specific computer requirements of MOD staff as a means of providing a more effective and productive working environment at the Ministry. The introduction, for example, of a local area network should speed up access to and dissemination of information as well as improving control of data held. As a first step, it would be necessary to embark on a review of IT needs throughout the organization and to develop an IT strategy for MOD. Part of this initial work would involve identifying the systems in place, the MOD user requirements, the options available in terms of software and hardware solutions, the IT security, organizational and manpower issues involved as well as the technical and financial implications of any proposals presented.

8.66 We understand that the technical expertise to undertake this work is not available in-house and we therefore consider the best way to proceed would be to commission a study by local consultants to undertake this strategic review. **We recommend** that this course of action is adopted and, that if MOD does not have access to the necessary funding required, the Ministry should identify potential donor(s) who may be willing to meet the initial cost involved as well as the expense of implementing any technical solution recommended.

**8.67 Communication and Information Services:** This Unit is primarily responsible for development of policy for strategic and tactical communication systems throughout Defence. The main communication centre is based at Cockerill with links to all brigades in the country.

8.68 We are informed that the communication link between MOD and JSC is presently limited to the telephone, an open and unsecured line, and if senior officers at the former location are required to monitor any field unit they have to go through the main communications centre. In operational terms, we are advised that there is a requirement for a control room, with secure communications facilities, to be located in the directorate so that an adequate

monitoring capability is available to the senior command personnel based at MOD. **We recommend** accordingly.

8.69 **Vetting:** We were informed that there are no prescribed vetting processes applied to staff working at MOD and, as a result, no formal procedures are currently in operation at the organization in terms of access to files or information. We understand that MOD is currently working with other security agencies in Sierra Leone in developing an agreed security vetting system but that there are operational problems in implementing policies because of the lack of availability of personnel records and trained staff. We are advised that it is desirable for such a vetting system to be in place and **we therefore recommend** that the attention of the GOSL should be drawn to the present situation.

### **Staffing**

8.70 As indicated earlier in the report, it was impossible to relate the Ministry's authorized establishment of 1448 for civilian staff published in the 2003 budget estimates with the actual staff in post in terms of job designation and grade. In part, we were told that this was due to historical practice and partly the fact that information was held in separate places in the Ministry and was not coordinated. The fact that management control of staff is fragmented also does not help the situation. As a result, information on existing vacancies could not be fully corroborated or validated. **We recommend** that the Ministry, in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance and Establishment Secretary's Office, should ensure that the authorized manpower figures approved and published in the 2004 budget estimates reflect the actual allocation agreed by post, job designation and grade. This will assist in future in identifying posts with allocated jobs.

8.71 Of the civilian personnel managed through the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, we were informed that one hundred and twenty of these staff held permanent and pensionable posts in the Civil Service. This was on the basis that they had been appointed by the PSC and had been issued appointment letters by the Establishment Secretary's Office. It transpires that these staff had not participated in the verification exercise conducted by the Establishment Secretary's Office and the Accountant General's Department over the last couple of years, and, as a result, their official status had not been validated. In the circumstances, **we recommend** that the staff in question should now report to the Establishment Secretary's Office in order to participate in the verification process and so that they can be issued with a PIN number in appropriate cases. This will ensure that they are placed on the Ministry's payroll by the Accountant General's Department and that they are considered by the Establishment Secretary's Office for promotion, postings etc in the usual way.

8.72 A comparison between the nominal roll and the payroll for September indicated that the Ministry paid twenty five staff more that month than the total names listed on the civilian staff list for the period in question. (Details of these

discrepancies were drawn to the attention of senior management for consideration and to take any appropriate action). There is a need to resolve the reason for the differences between the two sets of figures so that the staff list tallies with the payroll. As soon as this has been done, **we recommend** that the Ministry should undertake a reconciliation exercise each month between the approved staff list and the payroll to ensure that the two sets of figures correspond. If differences are identified, remedial action should be taken to correct the matter promptly.

8.73 The Ministry does not currently use standard manpower budgeting and staff complementing techniques to assess its staffing requirements; as a result its establishment is not based on validated functions and defined workloads. It was apparent during this study that staffing levels were particularly generous in some areas of work while we were told that there were skills shortages in others. There is a need for the Ministry, in conjunction with the Establishment Secretary's Office, to develop and introduce quantitative techniques and methods of accurately assessing workloads, particularly job inspection, as part of its manpower planning and control processes. **We recommend** that this approach be adopted. A start has already been made in developing a job inspection capacity in the Civil Service and the MOD should be encouraged to participate in this process.

8.74 In conjunction with the planned draw down in numbers of uniformed personnel in the RSLAF referred to in paragraph 8.2, we were told that there is also a corresponding exercise in hand to reduce the number of civilian staff working in MOD/RSLAF. We understand that a Working Group has been set up under the chairmanship of the Director of Staff and Administration and a decision has been taken to reduce the number of civilian personnel by 530 from the end of January 2004. To assist this process, **we recommend** that a physical head count should be carried out during December 2003 of all civilian staff working for MOD/RSLAF. From observation and spot checks undertaken during this study, there is some evidence to indicate that a substantial number of work service employees are not reporting to work regularly. No advance warning should be given of any spot checks to be undertaken and they should not coincide with the normal payment period of salaries.

8.75 In terms of numbers of ancillary staff employed at MOD, we were informed that there are twenty-nine cleaners and eight gardeners employed at Tower Hill. There will be a continuing need to employ cleaners and gardeners at Tower Hill but the present figure is excessive for the amount of work involved and a more realistic complement in our view would be 15 cleaners and six gardeners. **We recommend** that the authorized complement should be set at this lower figure and that the Ministry should discuss with the Establishment Secretary's Office and the Ministry of Finance the feasibility of consolidating these posts into the MOD permanent establishment.

8.76 **We also recommend** that management control of clerical and ancillary staff at MOD should be the responsibility of the Staff Superintendent in line with the practice adopted at other ministries. At present, this responsibility is split between the Staff Superintendent and the Facilities Manager.

8.77 As far as numbers of uniformed personnel based at MOD were concerned, we obtained the impression that the present figure is excessive particularly in terms of support staff eg orderlies. We were told, however, that a number of the posts in question were allocated on a personal basis to military officers, in line with their existing terms and conditions of service. The matter was subject to ongoing review.

### **Training and Staff Development**

8.78 Uniformed personnel have access to their own training programmes and facilities and, in general, we were informed that this appears to be working well. Nevertheless, the planned withdrawal of IMATT officers from their existing positions in line management positions at MOD to an advisory role in future will place additional responsibilities on their Sierra Leonean counterparts and the specific training needs involved will need to be identified and met. In part, this can probably be covered by on the job training but in other instances the requirement may demand the provision of more formal training programmes both in country and overseas.

8.79 As indicated earlier in the report, there is no prescribed training policy for civilian staff at MOD and **we recommend** that one is now developed and introduced that takes into account the needs of these employees. A number of administrative staff have undergone job related training courses since the new MOD organization was set up and most clerical staff have had the opportunity of undertaking basic computer courses. Some staff have also attended job related courses but we were told repeatedly – and it was clearly apparent - during this study that there was a shortage of professional and administrative skills in key management positions. It is now important in our view to build on and enhance existing skills so individual employees can fully meet their own particular job specification. To assist this process, **we recommend** that a training needs assessment be undertaken, with outside assistance if necessary. When the needs assessment exercise is completed donor help can be sought to enable the training plan to be realized.

### **Material Resources**

8.80 In common with other Ministries, MOD is experiencing major financial constraints in terms of reducing its planned expenditure to within agreed allocation and it is having to prioritize accordingly. As a result, we were told that often photocopiers were not working due to lack of toner and there were other shortages but generally the Ministry appears to be better placed in terms of office

equipment than most Ministries we have visited during these administrative reviews.

8.81 Cleaners and gardeners complained in particular about the lack of suitable equipment and tools to do their work. Apparently, there is only one carpet cleaner available to serve the whole building and there is a shortage of buckets and brushes. Gardeners referred to the lack of gardening tools available although management indicated that these had been provided in the past. **We recommend** that an inventory be taken of existing equipment available to cleaning and gardening staff to identify any shortfall in requirements, and, if the necessary funding is available, to purchase any materials and equipment needed.

8.82 Lack of transport was also cited as a problem particularly by clerks and runners who have to travel regularly between Tower Hill and various military establishments in the Freetown area. MOD has only one utility vehicle available and we are told that staff are often required to use public transport to undertake official duties and this can be very time consuming. **We recommend** that, as funding becomes available, MOD should purchase two motorcycles for the use of staff at Tower Hill to enable them to carry out their duties more efficiently.

## **Communications**

8.83 The Ministry has a very active Directorate of Public Relations and Information that is responsible for bringing defence issues to the attention of the public as well as to those serving within the Armed Forces. The unit publishes a monthly newspaper, The Torch, and a quarterly news bulletin that is designed to inform and sensitize people about the present activities of the Ministry and RSLAF. It is also involved in contributing to radio and local television programmes, dealing with media enquiries and supporting the Minister in promoting the policies and activities of the Ministry and RSLAF.

8.84 We spoke to representatives of Civil Society in order to gain their views of the present efforts of the Ministry and RSLAF to promote their corporate image. The reaction was mixed with an acknowledgement that in Freetown and most districts some confidence and support in the present role of the Armed Forces had been achieved although more needs to be done particularly in Kono and Kailahun Districts where perceptions are more negative. This may be due to the alleged military involvement in the illegal harvesting of local resources and the misuse of official vehicles. We understand that at one stage effective working links were established by MOD with some Civil Society organizations but that these were no longer active. **We recommend** that the links between military and Civil Society organizations should be re-activated in order to improve mutual understanding and develop confidence building with the population.

## 9. IMPLEMENTATION

9.1 We discussed our emerging findings with representatives of the Ministry at the end of the fieldwork stage of the study and explained the proposed sequence of events when the final report was prepared. Subject to the decisions taken on the merits and implementation of individual recommendations, we suggest the following timetable be adopted.

<b>Recommendations that can be implemented in the short term</b>	<b>Approximate Timescale</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
Grouping of functions in Option 1 should be Adopted (Rec 3)	0-3 months	MOD
The revised directorate structure proposed should be introduced (Rec 4)	0-3 months	MOD
Establishment Secretary's Office to approve revised structure and mount evaluation of senior management posts (Rec 5)	0-3 months	MOD & Estab Sect Office
Pay anomalies at MOD be drawn to attention of consultants undertaking GOSL Pay & Grading Reform Study (Rec 6)	Immediate	Coordinator, Public Sector Reform Unit
Concerns about frequent change of PS at MOD to be brought to attention of Civil Service Postings Committee (Rec 7)	Immediate	MOD/Estab Sect Office
Preparation of Management Plan for MOD (Rec 8)	0-3 months	MOD
Work Plans to be prepared at directorate level (Rec 9)	0-3 months	MOD
Written job descriptions to be prepared for all professional, administrative & clerical staff (Rec 10)	0-3 months	MOD
Annual audit work programme to be prepared for approval of Deputy Minister (Rec 14)	3 months	MOD
A report should be issued for each audit (Rec 15)	Immediate	MOD
The Assistant Secretary post in the Staff and Administration Directorate should be assigned specific responsibility for civilian personnel matters at MOD (Rec 29)	Immediate	MOD
PS & CDS should agree administrative standard of procedures to be observed by MOD staff (Rec 30)	Immediate	MOD
Clerks in the Central Registry should carry out a file census at fortnightly intervals (Rec 32)	Immediate	MOD
The Establishment Secretary's Office to be consulted about payment of allowances to clerks acting in secretarial capacity (Rec 33)	Immediate	MOD and Estab Sect Office
The MA posts in the Offices of the Deputy Minister and CDS should be upgraded to rank of Lt Colonel (Rec 34)	0-3 months	MOD
Manpower figures approved and published in 2004 Budget estimates for MOD should reflect	0-3 months	MOD, Estab Sect Office & Ministry of Finance

allocation agreed (Rec 38)		
Civilian staff, managed through AFPC, holding permanent and pensionable posts should report to Establishment Secretary Office for verification action (Rec 39)	Immediate	MOD and Estab Sect Office
A monthly reconciliation exercise to be undertaken between approved Staff List and the payroll (Rec 40)	Immediate	MOD
Physical count should be undertaken of all civilian staff working for MOD/RSLAF (Rec 42)	December 2003	MOD
The number of cleaner and gardeners at Tower Hill should be reduced from 29 and 8 to 15 and 6 respectively (Rec 43)	0-3 months	MOD
Management control of clerical and ancillary staff at MOD should be exercised through the Staff Superintendent (Rec 44)	0-3 months	MOD
Inventory to be undertaken of equipment available to cleaners and gardeners (Rec 46)	Immediate	MOD

<b>Recommendations that are of high priority but requiring planning &amp; organization</b>	<b>Approximate Timescale</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
Existing legislation to be updated or amended (Recs 1&2)	During 2004	MOD & Office of Solicitor General
The Draft Scheme of Service to be reviewed and resubmitted for approval (Rec 11)	3-6 months	MOD and Estab Sect Office
Procedures should be developed to monitor and manage activity and programme performance against budgets (Rec 12)	3-6 months	MOD
Programme managers be provided with regular management reports (Rec 13)	3-6 months	MOD
Priority should be given to further professional training for audit staff (Rec 16)	Dependent on availability of funding & outcome of TNA	MOD and donor assistance
The Office of the Auditor General should undertake an audit of MOD (Rec 17)	During 2004	MOD & Office of Auditor General
Procurement activities at MOD should be centralized in Dir of Procurement (Rec 18)	3-6 months	MOD
MOD should investigate the possibility of arranging "Call Off" contracts (Rec 19)	3-6 months	MOD
The existing informal Procurement Working Group should be replaced by the Procurement Committee (Rec 20)	3-6 months	MOD
A tracking system to be introduced in procurement process (Rec 21)	3-6 months	MOD
Current MOD committee practices and procedures should be reviewed (Rec 22)	3-6 months	MOD

The Principal Personnel & Administration Board and Equipment Approvals and Procurement Committee should be abolished (Rec 23)	3-6 months	MOD
The Defence Estates Committee should be managed at directorate level in future (Rec 24)	3-6 months	MOD
Any review of the Higher Management Defence Committee structure should examine case for DPOC subsuming the present role and functions of Defence Management Board (Rec 25)	3-6 months	MOD
Working Group should be set up to determine status of civilian staff working for RSLAF (Rec 26)	3-6 months	MOD, Estab Sect Office & Ministry Of Finance
MOD to develop a personnel policy covering civilian staff (Rec 27)	3-6 months	MOD and Estab Sect Office
Appraisal reporting system should be introduced (Rec 28)	2004	MOD and Estab Sect Office
MOD to be included in any Central Records Management Review undertaken (Rec 31)	When programme gets underway	Public Service Reform Unit
Lack of vetting process for MOD staff to be drawn to attention of GOSL (Rec 37)	2004	MOD & GOSL
The Ministry should introduce quantitative techniques and methods of accurately assessing workloads as part of its manpower planning responsibilities (Rec 41)	6-12 months	MOD and Estab Sect Office
Links between Military and Civil Society to be re-activated (Rec 48)	3-6 months	MOD

<b>Recommendations relating to material resources or external inputs</b>	<b>Approximate Timescale</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
A review of MOD Information Technology requirements to be undertaken (Rec 35)	6 months	MOD plus donor assistance
Provision of secure communication facilities at Tower Hill (Rec 36)	6-12 months	MOD and donor help
A training needs analysis to be carried out (Rec 45)	6 months	Donor funding possibly already identified
Provision of motor cycles for staff at Tower Hill (Rec 47)	6 months	MOD as funding becomes available.